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ABSTRACT 
In this study, the author focuses on France, exclusively, to illuminate the potential 
causes for material and/or ideological support to terror in that society, and further 
indicates how these trends may be evident or potential throughout Western societies.  As 
in recent years, the word “Muslim” has become synonymous with terror in the daily 
lexica of France and other Western societies, this thesis demonstrates that terrorism is not 
a spontaneous or stand-alone problem.  Terror and other forms of extremism in France—
whether imminent or imagined—mark an end form of the true issue:  social exclusion, or 
alienation, or isolation of French Muslims. French society’s Republican values of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity make no distinction for such identity factors as ethnicity and 
religion. 
This study focused on the French headscarf ban, with its goal of promoting 
integration.  This thesis demonstrates that the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls in 
French society was manifested as a challenge to French identity and the tradition of 
laïcité, or secularism.  These ideas, and others central to Frenchness, or Françité, are seen 
in the French polity as threatening, as well as a visual representation to the threat posed 
by the influx of Muslim immigrants and their failure to assimilate. 
This thesis concludes by demonstrating that issues such as racism, Islamaphobia, 
and social alienation or exclusion are the vehicles that radical Islamists prey upon to find 
potential jihadists.  If the headscarf ban is politicized by the fundamental Muslim 
community, the ban ultimately might prove counterproductive resulting in reduced 
integration in public schools, more segregation, and a radicalized Muslim community 
hostile to the Western traditions that France holds so dear. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Are terrorists the product of a “social crisis”?  As the collective assumptions of 
both the Western vox populi and leading policymakers in the United States and Europe 
increasingly link radicalized Muslims to global acts of terrorism, the question of how 
these terrorists are made gains urgency.  Why do they hate us, a thoughtful Westerner 
might profitably ask, particularly of his fellow citizens who are embracing such 
destructive ideologies?  What prompts people who may have grown up in, say, France or 
Britain to reject the fundamental tenets of pluralistic democracy in favor of annihilatory 
martyrdom?  The answer often begins with a reference to a crisis in these very ideals, or 
at least in their execution, sufficient to discourage, if not to exclude, Muslims in the 
country from joining the national project.  If the Muslim citizens of the West feel they 
have nothing to gain by integrating into Western society, then what do they have to lose 
by hastening its demise? 
On February 14, 2007, the Sous-Directorate Anti-Terroriste, the Counterterrorist 
subdivision of the French national police, arrested eleven French citizens for recruiting 
volunteers willing to travel to Iraq in order to battle Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).  
Six of them were later charged with “criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist 
venture."  Three additional suspects were placed under formal investigation for financing 
international terrorism.  These arrests revealed that since the since the summer of 2004, 
French authorities had been investigating groups of young Muslims who were attempting 
to join the jihadi in Iraq to fight MNF-I.  Indeed, in 2004, MNF-I had killed three young, 
Muslim Frenchmen fighting north of Baghdad.1 
In late 2004, French authorities identified a French Muslim fighting MNF-I in 
Fallujah as the leader of an Iraqi armed group.  These findings led French authorities to 
investigate and later dismantle three recruiting networks in Paris, Tours, and Montpellier.  
According to press reports, these networks were providing assistance to insurgents in 
                                                 
1 Pascal Combelles-Siegel, “French Authorities Dismantle Network of Fighters Bound for Iraq.”  
Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Volume 4, Issue 3, February 27, 2007.  
http://chechnya.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370261 (accessed February 27, 2007) 
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Iraq, while the Parisian network actively recruited and operated from the Mosque of 
Adda'Wa in the nineteenth arrondissement of Paris and from a musalla, or prayer hall, in 
the Parisian suburb of Levallois.    
These arrests heightened French anxieties that a generation of Muslim youths is 
opting out of traditional French Republican values.  The realization that some young 
French Muslim citizens are willing to abandon their lives in the Hexagon to fight the 
jihad in cities throughout Iraq is shocking to many French people.  These citizens are 
sons of Muslim immigrants born in France.  However, they identify not with the values 
that underpin the French Republic, but with the idea that the global Muslim community is 
suffering at the hands of the West in general and the United States in particular.  Even 
more shocking to the French is the stark realization that these French Muslims who find 
their way to battlefields around the globe, are not all refugees from the desolate, Muslim 
dominated banlieues, or French ghettos.  In fact, two of those arrested in February 2007 
were university students studying technical fields.2 
The French experience is being repeated throughout Europe.  The tensions and 
trends within Muslim immigrant communities challenge traditional social practices and 
concepts of nationhood in Europe.  European societies struggle to assimilate Muslim 
immigrants into traditional paradigms of nation, state, citizenship and religion.  The 
participation of some Muslims in terrorist activities has become a security issue, which 
may only worsen with the growth of Europe’s Muslim population and the perception of a 
“clash of civilizations,” between Islam and the West.  These issues are paramount for 
defense policymakers, especially as Islam has become a European religion, on that 
challenges traditional notions of nation, state, citizenship, and political ideas firmly 
rooted in modern Europe. 
A. CASE STUDY SELECTION 
In order to study the changing profile of Muslims in Europe, this author has 
reviewed information to identify the degree to which a European country has developed 
as a society of inclusion or exclusion, and then to determine the degree to which Muslims 
                                                 
2 Combelles-Siegel, 2. 
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are successfully integrated into that society.  While this problem of integration or 
assimilation affects much of Europe, this study will focus on France.   
The Netherlands, Germany, and France have all passed legislation perceived as 
hostile to Muslim groups or communities within the society.  As a result, citizens of 
minority ethnicities or religions, especially Muslims, feel alienated.  Amongst these three 
countries, France is particularly interesting because of the historic imperial interplay 
between North Africa and Metropolitan France.  France has, in recent years, enacted 
significant pieces of public law and immigration legislation that Muslims consider 
hostile.  This legislation and the tension that it both reflects and creates have inspired 
voluminous media and academic attention, which form the basis of this study.  Other 
European countries look to France as a model for Muslim integration, for better or worse.  
This thesis will deal with the debate on French identity and immigration by situating the 
contemporary discourse within its historical and cultural contexts.  In order to understand 
better the issues of Muslim alienation within France, one must understand French history, 
to include the role of North Africa and North Africans, race relations, and Islam in 
modern French society. 
The French ideal of laïcité, or secularism, is a bedrock of French Republican 
identity and a legacy of the Age of Reason and the Revolution.  In 1989, that ideal was 
tested when a French headmaster expelled a Muslim student for wearing her headscarf in 
the classroom.  In the subsequent litigation, which pitted laícité against religious 
freedom, the courts, whose arguments primarily centered on which symbols were 
permissible, ruled that symbols were permitted so long as they were not worn or 
displayed with the goal of “pressure, provocation, proselytism, or propaganda.”3    
The terrorist bombings of 1995 in the Paris Metro as well as the events of 
September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, led to a rise of Islamaphobia 
throughout the West.4  The perception that Muslims were invading France deepened 
                                                 
3  “Q & A: Muslim Headscarves.”  
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetoos/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3328277.stm (accessed 
November 21, 2006) 
4 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe.  (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 58. 
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Republican fears that the foundational principles of French Republican identity were 
under siege.  The headscarf, or hijab, became a symbol of a cultural clash.5  The public 
sentiment led the French President, Jacques Chirac, to establish an independent 
commission in January 2004 to research the modern interpretation of ideas and the 
implementation of contemporary secularism in French society, or “to reflect upon the 
modern application of laícité.”6  After four months of testimonies and investigations, this 
commission, led by the French politician and former ombudsman of the French Republic 
Bernard Stasi, a first generation Frenchman of Mexican and Italian heritage, 
recommended twenty-five measures to the French leadership.  President Chirac chose 
only one of these measures to take before the Parliament.  On March 3, 2004, the French 
Senate approved the law “prohibiting the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in 
public elementary and secondary schools.7  Polls at the time demonstrate that 
approximately 60 percent to 70 percent of the French population supported the ban.8 
This thesis will assess the ban’s impact on the French, including France’s Muslim 
minority.  In this connection, one must also explore:   
• What does it mean to be “French,” and furthermore, how does being 
“French” pertain to questions of peace, security, and defense? 
• How has the concept of citizenship and nationhood evolved in France? 
• What developments have occurred within French society since the 
imposition of the ban? 
• How do persons who feel victimized or segregated react within French 
society? 
                                                 
5 Jocelyn Cesari, “Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority.” 
www.libertysecurity.org/imprimer.php?id_article=234 (accessed November 21, 2006) 
6 Patrick Weil, “A Nation in Diversity: France, Muslims, and the Headscarf.” 
www.openDemocracy.net; (accessed November 23, 2006), 1. 
7 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in 
Contemporary France. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 163. 
8 “Q & A: Muslim Headscarves.” 
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• What are the broader implications of the French experience within Europe, 
and potentially within the United States, and how might the US 
experience, conversely be of benefit to French society? 
 
The importance of this topic and its relevance to the issues of politics, society, and 
security will have utility for policymakers within the U.S. Department of State and U.S. 
European Command as they advise and assist European countries and even, perhaps, 
cooperate with the European Union in matters of vital, mutual interest.  At present, 
Europe struggles to assimilate growing Muslim immigrant populations, as well as to 
prepare for European Union expansion into Southeastern Europe, which encompasses 
Bosnia with its significant Muslim population.  There remains additionally, and the 
possible entrance of the first European Muslim country, Turkey.  The question of Muslim 
assimilation affects all levels of European governance, as communities as small as 
hamlets and as large as the European Union are and will continue to develop policies that 
strive to promote fair and equitable immigration as well as successful integration of 
immigrant populations.  These policies must meet the challenge of “Old European” 
nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-Muslim/anti-immigrant racism.  The findings and 
recommendations in this thesis may have further application for additional research into 
controlling the rise of ideological support to terror as well as spontaneous terrorism 
within both Europe and the United States.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Nationalism, “Frenchness,” and Immigration  
The evolution of nationalism is a focus of much current scholarship about 
Europe.9   Hagen Schulze and John Breuilly highlight the scholarly literature on the 
evolution of state, society, and nation in modern Europe.10  The literature on French 
                                                 
9 One compilation of a series of essays that encompass the ideas, emotions, and events that helped 
shaped the image of Frenchmen is Hans Kohn’s, Making of the Modern French Mind.  (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1955). 
10 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State.  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Hagen 
Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism.  (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994). 
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nationalism is broad and covers all facets of society, politics, economy, and mentality to 
include the writings of Voltaire, the emergence of French as a national language, the 
“rebirth” of French pride under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, and the leading 
works of French history.11  UCLA Professor Eugen Weber’s outstanding Peasants into 
Frenchmen focuses on the transformation of rural life in the face of the modernizing and 
nationalizing forces in the Third Republic.  Unfortunately, the scope of this account of 
the modernization of rural France during the late eighteenth and nineteenth century fails 
to incorporate the period during and following the Second World War.12  A study of the 
“Dark Years,” or those long fifty months between 1940 and 1944, when the German 
occupation extinguished the famous lights of la cité lumière and temporarily eclipsed 
French grandeur, reveals another aspect of the French nation, as does les trente 
glorieuses of French post-war recovery.  These years matter signally to the state of 
Muslim citizenship today. 
During the winter of 1940-1941, the inhabitants of occupied France faced national 
hardships.  These Frenchmen were forced to cope with the constant hunt for fuel and 
food.  With unemployment at more than 1.1 million and the oppression and deportation 
of French Jews and French workers to Germany with the collusion of the Vichy 
government, the French nation found itself humiliated and its proud culture abased.  The 
French self-image transitioned from world power to victim at the hands of German 
aggression.  The idea of victimization was promoted in the popular mind as members of 
the French Resistance defended French pride by refusing to accept German occupation.13  
The June 1944 Allied invasion accelerated a campaign of German atrocities aimed at 
destroying the French Resistance and its supporters at Tulle and Oradour-sur-Glane.  
Adolf Hitler insisted—fortunately in vain—that Paris “should go down with him and his 
Thousand Year Reich.”14   
                                                 
11 Works include but are not limited solely to Roger Price’s A Concise History of France and Simon 
Serfaty’s France, DeGaulle, and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the 
Continent. See Bibliography for more literature on French history. 
12 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914.  
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976). 
13 Alistair Horne, La Belle France: A Short History.  (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 353-362. 
14 Ibid., 368. 
 7
On August 26, 1944, de Gaulle marched down the Champs Elysees in his uniform 
to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier amid thousands of cheering 
Frenchmen.15  With each step, de Gaulle reflected his vision of France—“The glories of 
the past were associated with today’s,” he stated as he continued to walk proudly through 
Paris despite shots being fired as he approached the cathedral of Notre Dame.  De Gaulle 
believed in the fortune of France, and began his campaign of national revival almost 
immediately—a campaign based on his ability to rally his people around their shared 
hardships and collective memories.16  
After having resigned in 1946, Charles de Gaulle returned to the presidency in 
1958 to continue his interrupted rescue of “French ascendancy.”  During de Gaulle’s 
tenure, many of the modern ideas of what it means to be truly French were cemented into 
the French populace.  During these years (1958-1973), the Fifth French Republic again 
began to feel as if it had regained its previous grandeur.17  Unfortunately, the Fifth 
Republic nurtured other problems within French society.   
France’s colonial aspirations spanned the globe during its centuries of 
preeminence.  However, France established only one significant French colony of 
settlement after the fall of Quebec in 1759: Algeria.  Because Algeria was considered an 
integral part of Metropolitan France, Paris faced the dilemma of how to integrate nine 
million Muslims.  The end of the Algerian War in 1962 seemed to resolve this problem.  
By shedding the burden of an overwhelming Muslim province, de Gaulle, in effect, 
affirmed the vision of France as a “European nation, racially white, culturally Greek and 
Latin, and religiously Christian.”18  Unfortunately, this idea, while rooted in traditional 
French society, presently made it difficult for France to adapt to profound changes 
occurring within the Hexagon and throughout Europe.  Although Algeria was no longer 
                                                 
15 Horne, 373. 
16 Ibid., 374-375. 
17 One of the most insightful accounts of this period is Philip Cerny’s The Politics of Grandeur: 
Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy.  Another history that demonstrates the life of Charles de 
Gaulle in its entirety is Bernard Ledwidge’s history, De Gaulle. This lengthy biography demonstrates how 
de Gaulle developed his views and love of France. 
18 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France.  
(London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 76.   
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French, North African Muslims continued to immigrate to Europe.  (Before this period, 
France, despite its history of immigration, had yet to face a sizeable, drastically different 
population that challenged the fundamentals premises of French identity.) 
The subject of Muslims, immigration, and integration in Europe has attracted a 
growing scholarship in previous years.19  Significant Muslim immigration in France 
began in the 1920s.  The French government allowed “Algerians,” members of the 
French empire since the 1830s, to enter France as an extension of the country’s gratitude 
to the Algerian soldiers who had fought valiantly on behalf of the French during World 
War I.  This migratory process expanded after World War II, when the European 
Community required guest workers to facilitate the reconstruction of European countries.  
France specifically broadened immigration to North Africans even as it waged a brutal 
counter-guerilla campaign in Algeria from 1954 to 1962.  These Muslims came to France 
for two primary reasons: a minority were harkis, Muslim Algerians who had fought for 
France between 1954 and 1962 and were no longer welcome in an independent Algeria; a 
second, far larger group, came in search of work.20   
2. Scholars of the Stasi Commission and Related Debate 
The French government’s decision to ban the wearing of headscarves in public 
schools has generated a great deal of debate among both scholars and journalists. The 
first group includes Western scholars who have studied Islam and immigration, among 
them the French scholars Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel, as well as Jonathon Laurence and 
Jocelyne Cesari. These scholars focused their attention on the debate between integration 
and assimilation as well as the successes and failures of various European governments to 
facilitate inter-racial and social convergence.21   Bassam Tibi, a German political scientist 
of Syrian descent, focuses on how Muslims can become productive members of 
                                                 
19 Works include “Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany” and countless journal and 
historical accounts of the history of North African migration into France.  See Bibliography. 
20 Christopher Caldwell, “Allah Mode.” The Weekly Standard, Volume 007, Issue 42, July 15, 2002, 
2. 
21 Like Roy and Kepel, Laurence and Cesari are renowned scholars with numerous publications in the 
subject of Muslims and Western Europe.  See Bibliography for the works by these authors utilized for this 
paper. 
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European societies.  However, unlike other European scholars, Tibi argues that Muslims 
can become part of their adopted societies while maintaining their cultural and historical 
linkages.  The clear distinction between integration and assimilation sets Tibi apart from 
his European contemporaries who demand social amalgamation, even when this means a 
loss of former cultural identities.22   All of these scholars, however, use their articles to 
divide French society into its various subcultures in order to explain the causes of the ban 
and its anticipated effects.  Still, they have failed to follow up on the impact of the 
implementation of the ban.  
3. “Sensational” Works 
The debate over the headscarf ban has generated a vibrant popular literature 
written by journalists.23  These sources, which are more widely available throughout the 
West, provide useful insights but tend to be sensational, if not alarmist.  These works 
focus more on the justifications for a ban and less on the effects that ban would have on 
integration and assimilation of immigrants.  These authors draw attention to the most 
dramatic aspects of the Muslim population in Europe: crime, unemployment, Muslim 
fundamentalism, female genital mutilation, “forced” marriages, etc.24  
The works of the Muslim feminists may be said to comprise a third category in 
the genre.  Irshad Manji and Ayaan Hirsi Ali portray the plight of Muslim women in a 
more extreme light than either Buruma or Bawer.25  These Muslim women, like their 
male contemporaries, argue that Muslim women encounter grave injustices in their 
predominantly-Muslim, immigrant communities and demonstrate how those inequalities, 
prejudices, and even crimes are in direct conflict with Western and European ideals and 
                                                 
22 Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics.  (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
23 This phenomenon has been observed by this author and was also referenced by Jonathon Laurence 
and Justin Vaisse during their interview with Phillip Gordon at the Brookings Institute in September 2006.  
See Bibliography for more information regarding these two authors and/or the aforementioned interview as 
well as lurid titles such as While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within and 
Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance. 
24 Both the Buruma book and the Bawer book referenced in the preceding footnote are popular 
examples of this phenomenon. 
25 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam. (New 
York: Free Press, 2006); and Irshad Manji, The Trouble With Islam Today.  (Canada: Random House, 
2003). 
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social conventions.26  The thrust of this literature is that Muslim women in the West 
deserve the same women’s rights as their Western sisters, and that Western leaders can, 
an indeed must, facilitate change.27  
C. THE MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT 
This study will attempt to explore what has happened since the law was enacted 
and how the ensuing societal circumstances have evolved into radicalism, disaffection, or 
terrorist designs among French Muslims.  The aforementioned authors demonstrate how 
Muslims arrive in Europe, how Europeans receive them, and how well those Muslims 
have integrated or assimilated inside their new countries, as well as the causes of these 
successes or failures.  Unfortunately, the search for literature on the post-Stasi situation 
reveals a response that runs the gamut from academic to polemical.  This paper will 
attempt to demonstrate the “ground truth" as it is found in the suburbs of cities such as 
Paris and Lille.  I will accomplish this with empirical data from surveys conducted within 
France since the imposition of the law,28 collusion of statistics of school attendance and 
private school enrollments, as well as through the incorporation of anecdotal, 
corroborating evidence gained from the results of interviews and questionnaires with 
E.U. officials, French immigration officers, French social workers, embassy staff 
members in Paris, Muslim organizations in France, and French citizens, both native 
French and Muslim immigrants. 
D. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
This study will discuss many terms that require definition, not the least of which 
is, what is a Muslim?  In modern media and political parlance, Muslims are seen as a  
 
                                                 
26 Claire Berlinski’s, Menace in Europe: Why the Continent’s Crisis is America’s, Too.  (New York: 
Three Rivers Press, 2006), is one example of a work that travels the same vein as Baruma and Bawer, yet 
highlights further the significant chasms between Western ideals and Muslim societies within Western 
countries. 
27 Fadela Amara, Breaking the Silence: French Women’s Voices from the Ghetto. (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2006). 
28 Detailed, quantifiable data was available from the recent Pew Survey and Rand Study by Cheryl 
Benard. Anecdotal evidence will be noted throughout this document. 
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group, the newest of Europe’s ethnicities.  Unfortunately, this is misleading because the 
homogenization and stereotyping of Muslims, as any “outsider” group, often provokes 
collective fear.   
Like Christianity, Islam comes in many forms that often reflect very different 
cultural nuances.  For example, Muslims from Indonesia distinguish themselves from 
Muslims in the Middle East.  These cultural distinctions might be as slight as 
pronunciation of key Muslim terms or as vast as the Central African insistence upon 
female genital mutilation (FGM) for young daughters.  Thus, it is evident that the 
religious practices of Muslims, and therefore the concept of Islam itself, are not 
monolithic.  However, for the purposes of this study, the author will refer to the Muslim 
community in France as a single entity.  This is primarily because the origin of the 
preponderance of French Muslims is North Africa generally, and Algeria specifically.  
Additionally, the majority of surveys conducted categorize Muslims as a single entity, 
even though there are significant regional differences in Algeria, as well as significant 
differences between the Arab and Berber racial sects within Algeria. 
The terms “assimilation” and “integration” will also be used throughout this 
thesis.  Although both terms generally refer to the amalgamation of parts into a whole, 
the delineation of these two terms will be crucial to our understanding of the current 
social dynamics and policies in France and throughout Europe.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, integration will refer to the combination of races and peoples within a given 
society.  Those being integrated will retain their existing cultural and/or religious identity 
in the new context of their adopted society.  Assimilation also refers to a grouping of 
persons into a larger society; however, unlike integration, assimilation, as a process, 
generates a new identity for those being assimilated.  The basic divergence between the 
two terms is a variation in retaining an existing identity or adopting the identity of the 
new society. 
Racism will also be a key factor to this research.   Although “race” is a biological 
category, it is as much a political and social construct that will be discussed in this 
research.  In modern, Western societies, the term “race” precisely captures the 
socioeconomic status, culture, and genes of a given group of persons.  Race-conscious 
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societies, such as those found in France, the United States, and most Western nations, 
limit their prevention of racism, because it perpetuates the ideas of differences between 
races.  Three significant levels of racism exist within French and most Western societies: 
institutionalized, personally mediated, and internalized.  Institutionalized racism is 
defined as differential access, based on race, to the goods, services, and opportunities 
within a given society.  Personally mediated racism is simply prejudice and 
discrimination against a group of people.  Prejudice manifests itself in assumptions about 
the group at issue, while discrimination is marked by differential actions towards that 
group.  Last, internalized racism is an acceptance by those stigmatized that they or their 
peers are lesser persons and/or have lower intrinsic worth.29  
E. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis will examine the Stasi Law and its impact on Muslims within French 
society.  Using the Congruence Procedure, this study will demonstrate how the law has 
created new, or exasperated existing social cleavages.30  In order to demonstrate this 
congruence I will highlight the causal effect within various segments of society.  The 
methodology for this will consist of five chapters.  The Introduction will focus on the 
foundation of the debate including the differences between integration and assimilation, 
the various manifestations of racism, and why France was chosen as a case study.  
Chapter II, “What Does It Mean To Be French?,” will focus on the history of French 
nationalism and the evolution of secularism in France through the Second World War and 
that conflicts’ immediate aftermath.  Chapter III, “Les Musulmans,” will highlight the 
change in French identity during the post-World War II decades, focusing on the war in 
Algeria and its effects, as well as the history of Muslim immigration to France; it then 
investigates why many French Muslim women seek to wear headscarves in France.  
Chapter IV, “Integration or Segregation?,” will concentrate on the origins, deliberations 
and recommendations of the Stasi Commission, and more importantly, the results of the 
                                                 
29 Camara Phyllis Jones, “Levels of Racism: A Theoretical Framework and a Gardener’s Tale.” 
American Journal of Public Health, August 2000, Vol. 90, No. 8, http://www.ajph.org/cgi/reprint/90/8/1212 
(accessed January 25, 2007) 
30 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. (Ithaca, New York, Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 58-59. 
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subsequent legislation.  The study will draw on empirical data since 2003.  This data will 
include statistics on school enrollment, as well as findings from large E.U., Rand, and 
Pew Surveys.  Additionally it will include evidence taken from interviews with French 
citizens from various backgrounds, religions, ethnicities, and economic statuses carried 
out by the author.  Chapter V, or the Conclusion, will suggest the consequences of these 
actions if they continue on their present track.  The conclusion will also draw on the 
Process Tracing Method to propose that aggravated social cleavage may lead to terror or 
the promotion of terror.31  The final chapter will conclude with recommendations for 
E.U. and U.S. policy makers to broaden the efforts to integrate the Western world’s 
growing Muslim community.   
                                                 
31 Van Evera, 64-67. 
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II. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE FRENCH? 
A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I understand genuine glory), this 
is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea.  To have 
common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to 
have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more—these 
are the essential conditions for being a people… 
—Ernest Renan, March 1882, the Sorbonne, Paris, France. 
 
The key to understanding the problem of Muslim integration in France, and its 
most symbolic struggle—the presence of the hijab in French schools—is to understand 
what it means to be French.  Can a Frenchwoman wear a Muslim headscarf and still 
count as French?  What cultural and social expectations attend the French national 
project?  Where does a French-speaking Northern African Muslim, however observant, 
fit into the French self-image?  While France encompasses regional, religious, and even 
cultural diversity, at its core lie specific sets of beliefs, values, and a common historical 
experience that might be said to define “Frenchness.”  “Frenchness” sets France apart 
from other European nations, even while it is firmly anchored in European culture and 
history.  This idea of a unique French identity shapes domestic politics.  To participate in 
“Frenchness,” immigrant groups must be prepared to forfeit their native identities and 
conform to the ideals and values of the French Republic.32 
Frenchness as defined by a modern citoyen of France would include a strong 
sense of history as a long and torturous process that has bestowed both grandeur and 
tragedy on the country, but which, at the same time, has created and sustained a coherent, 
recognizable cultural identity.  Beneath any apparent political division lies this 
                                                 
32 A detailed study of nationalism as it pertains to the various countries of Europe and France 
specifically can be illuminated with a review of Hagen Schulze’s, States, Nations, and Nationalism.  
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994); John Breuilly’s Nationalism and the State. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982); Gérard Noiriel’s, The French Melting Pot.  (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996); Philip Gordon’s, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the 
Gaullist Legacy.  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Rod Kedward’s France and the 
French: A Modern History. (Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2005); Hans Kohn’s, Making of the Modern 
French Mind.  (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1955); as well as Lucien Romier’s, A History of 
France.  (London: Macmillan and Company, 1964). 
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fundamental cultural identity, which resides in the inculcation of shared national values 
and a sense of common interests and counterbalances both the centrifugal tendencies of 
pluralism and the personal interests of the individual citoyen.  A similar discussion with a 
Briton or a German might reveal a comparable sense of national identity; however, 
France is singular in that its identity is deeply rooted in the Revolutionary and Republican 
tradition of the country, which is where this chapter necessarily begins.33  This study 
seeks to describe how French identity was formed out of a collection of differing peoples 
and languages in geographical proximity from the Revolutions of 1789 through 1871, to 
the Third Republic.  Finally, this chapter will explore the impacts of World War II and its 
aftermath.  This historical review will highlight key ideas and events from the French 
past that contributed to the creation of a defined French identity, oftentimes referred to in 
contemporary language as Françité, or Frenchness.    
A. UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Republican values, secularism, and language form key components of national 
identity that are transmitted primarily through the educational system.  They form the 
foundation of French nationalism.  French nationalism can be traced through five distinct 
periods beginning with the medieval era and culminating with the Algerian conflict and 
its repercussions in the latter half of the twentieth century.  This chapter will focus on the 
development of French identity through the first four of these periods, ending with World 
War II. This account begins with feudal France, discussing society, religion, and the 
state’s subsequent role in conjunction with religion.  The French Revolution at the end of 
the eighteenth century brought the feudal period to a bloody end, but it also witnessed the 
formulation of a secular, Republican strain of French identity and the propagation of 
French-inspired values as “universal,” applicable to all societies throughout Europe.  
Although French power steadily declined with the fall of Napoleon in 1815, French 
identity continued to develop through the industrialization and modernization of the 
Third Republic.  The Second World War put new strains on the French self-image, but it 
                                                 
33Peter Fritzsche’s, Germans into Nazis. (Boston, Harvard University Press, 1998) and Linda Colley’s 
Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. (New Haven: Connecticut, 1992) demonstrate the ideas of German 
and British nationalism, respectively. 
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also advanced Frenchness as a workable concept in the post-war world order. Taken 
together, the first four periods encompass the creation and formulation of the ideas of 
“White France.”34  In the process, France was able to forge a national identity out of 
diverse and, at times, competing political and religious values. 
Nationalism has sometimes been described as the secular religion of the Industrial 
Age.35  That is to say, the industrialization of a society broke down regional barriers that 
contributed to changes in society, economy, and ideas.  The sources of traditions in 
France shape the French idea of nation and self today.  At the onset, the French state 
consisted of the church and the crown.  France’s limited idea of nation was, as Hagen 
Schulze defined it, “that nation as a system of estates or an aristocratic hierarchy.” This 
nation’s roots were in the feudal system, but the emerging post-medieval state was 
intended to be permanent, with an authority that would endure beyond particular 
individuals.36  
The aftermath of the Hundred Years War in the fifteenth century, which led to the 
expulsion of the English from the Continent, distorted the earlier growth patterns.37  The 
need for new development and economic growth facilitated the emplacement of four 
revenue districts in the state.  This bureaucratic development led to the establishment of a 
corps of civil servants, who would manage this state as well as coordinate and channel 
the power of the church.38  The historian Roger Price, of the University of Wales 
attributed the origins of a French sense of “being different from other peoples” to the 
                                                 
34 White France is a term used throughout modern literature.  This term has many meanings.  To some 
it is the racial way of saying that France is a Catholic country founded by white men, while to others, White 
France is merely a description of the France of the period prior to significant African migration into the 
Hexagon during the twentieth century.  Still others use the term to strike contrast between the continental 
European French Republic and African France, that is to say, those colonies and departments of imperial 
France whose citizens immigrate to France.   
35 The French artist, Jean-Louis David, painted the idea of the secular religion of nation.  See Linda 
Colley’s Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1992),215  
36 Schulze, 9. 
37 Roger Price, A Concise History of France.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 143. 
38 Schulze, 37. 
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period immediately following the Hundred Years War.39  The relative control of the 
church over the state—and vice-versa—was challenged during the Reformation and 
Counter-Reformation; these revolutions were not strictly religious, however.  The 
upheaval of these periods not only altered faith and church relative to society, but also 
shaped the formation of France with a central state focused on the court versus the nobles 
and the feudal estates.40 
Religion had held sway over the French countryside for centuries.  The Catholics 
and Calvinists engaged in a series of bloody religious wars in the late 1500s, with 
religious zealots committing atrocities on both sides.41  These wars of religion were 
brought to a close in April 1598 by the Edict of Nantes, in which Henri IV consolidated 
peace by “separating religious and political obedience.  France set an unprecedented 
example of religious toleration, then a strange notion in all other states, both Protestant 
and Catholic.”42  This novel idea, coupled with Henri IV’s conversion to Catholicism, 
formed the solution to the ubiquitous, consistent religious battles throughout the French 
countryside since the mid-sixteenth century.  Despite Henri IV’s benevolent government 
and its postwar reconstruction efforts, he was murdered by a religious zealot in 1610, 
precipitating a period of power struggles and the eventual autocratic rule of Louis XIV 
from 1661.43   
The intellectual justification of a strong monarchy that could ensure the peace is 
to be found in Jean Bodin’s Six Livres de la République, in which he argues in favor of a 
powerful government to establish the rule of law in a neutral and rational fashion.44  
Bodin’s theory contributed in part to the diminution of aristocratic controls and the 
concentration of power in the monarchy.45  Under a monarchy that continued, with brief 
                                                 
39 Price, 12. 
40 Schulze, 40. 
41 Ibid., 45. 
42 David H. Pinkney and G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, History of France.  (Arlington Heights, Illinois: 
The Forum Press, 1983), 125. 
43 Pinkney and G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, 127, and 130-151. 
44 Schulze, 50. 
45 Ibid., 51. 
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interruptions, in one form or another until 1870, France remained a largely rural nation.  
The challenge of the Third Republic from 1871 was to mobilize the peasantry and 
transform them into citizens.  Understanding how the peasants became part of the fabric 
of national life demonstrates the transition from peasants to citizens and patriots.  The 
secular religion of nationalism thus developed alongside, and on occasion in opposition 
to, the Catholicism that was the religion of the majority of Frenchmen.  Within this 
secular space of the day, as it were, competition enabled society to shed the bonds of a 
state-supported religion and was thus one of the first steps toward a French nation. 
B. A WALK THROUGH HISTORY 
1. The Revolution, the Rise of Napoleon, and Industrialization 
If the French identity began to surface in the Hundred Years War, with the legend 
of the Maid of Orleans and her martyr’s death as a result of English and Burgundian 
treachery, the French Revolution accelerated the process of creating a French identity by 
giving it a mass political foundation.  Nationalism was born in the revolutionary period.  
Even so, the people of France formed a patchwork of languages with only the vaguest 
notions of what it meant to be French. 
In the eighteenth century, many French elites, as well as those throughout 
Northern and Western Europe, prospered from overseas trade on the basis of 
mercantilism.  However, limited local trade, poor communications, and high tariffs levied 
by governments and landowners, stymied economic integration.46  In France, the 
predominant unit of production was the small workshop, and these artisans were subject 
to the restrictive regulations of the guild.47  Until 1789, French society was organized as 
three estates: the clergy, the nobles or aristocrats, and the others.  In France, the noblesse 
formed a less-closed estate, compared to other states in Europe.  It was not a corporate 
body, and nobles were not debarred from all professions and trades.  In fact, access into 
the ranks of nobility remained open to wealthy commoners through the purchase of 
                                                 
46 George Rudé, “Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution,” in Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815. 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1964) 10-11. 
47 Ibid., 12. 
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hereditary offices.  The system of putting offices up for sale created, in the seventeenth 
century, a new and wealthy administrative nobility, the noblesse de robe (a reference to 
the official robes of office).  This new nobility had begun to challenge the social status of 
the older noblesse d’épée (nobility of the sword).  These older nobles both levied taxes 
and exempted themselves from taxation via the mechanism of hereditary privileges.  This 
new order challenged the status quo by drawing “middle-class elites away from 
productive careers in agriculture, industry, and commerce.”48 
The high clergy, who were members of the nobility, enjoyed even greater 
privileges. As landowners, they not only received incomes from rents and feudal dues, 
they also received religious tithes (equaling approximately one-twelfth of the yield of 
land).  They discharged their obligations to the Exchequer by the payment of a relatively 
small percentage of their income in the form of a don gratuit, or “voluntary gift.”49  In 
response to these harsh, long-standing institutions, French peasants began to change in 
this period. Britain already was in transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, 
and France incorporated some of these sweeping reforms into the nationalization of her 
masses—a process accelerated and stylized by the Revolution. 
The French Revolution was a complex event, with three catalysts.  The first was 
intellectual agitation, drawing on the ideas of the Enlightenment, which sought a more 
rational and efficient organization of government and society.  The emphasis fell on 
equality of rights and access vis-à-vis the state; old institutions and privileges were 
increasingly seen as incompatible with modern government and society. The writings of 
three French philosophers, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, were influential in 
shaping the intellectual environment of Revolutionary France and the world, although 
their viewpoints were very different.  Montesquieu wrote from a conservative and 
aristocratic perspective, stressing the legal basis on which a just society was organized.  
Voltaire was critical of the inefficiencies of aristocratic France and the injustices this 
outmoded system fostered. Jean Jacques Rousseau was the most subversive with his calls 
for the sovereignty of the people.  For Rousseau, like England’s Thomas Hobbes and 
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John Locke, citizens chose to participate in a government, or enter into a “social contract” 
to protect themselves from the state of nature; however, Rousseau, unlike Montesquieu 
highlighted that the laws of that government would extend rights and/or obligations to all 
citizens for the overall common good of the society's members.  Although Rousseau did 
not choose to depict the results of any disobedience to these laws in his work, he 
proposed various mechanisms to ascertain the "general will" within the society.  The 
writings of these three Philospohes energized revolutionaries and gave them an 
intellectual focus that facilitated democratic and popular revolution.50   
The second contributing element of the Revolution was the bankruptcy of the 
French state.51 Taxation became especially onerous in this period of economic downturn.  
Prices had outstripped wages.  In the first months of 1789, the price of wheat and bread 
increased by 50 percent, with no corresponding rise in wages.52  The amount of currency 
in circulation doubled as prices were forced up, while successive poor harvests reduced 
the availability of foodstuffs despite an increase in population.  (The period from 1760 
through 1780 saw an increase from 26.7 million to 27.5 million.)53  The bitter cold and 
floods of 1787 and 1788 led to a catastrophic grape harvest, when as many as 3 million 
Frenchmen were relying upon a bountiful harvest to restore their standards of living. At 
the same time, the tax regimen continued unabated, with officials insisting on collecting 
taxes at levels from more plentiful days.  The middle class and their peasant neighbors 
began to see themselves as victims of this system.  The taille, ventième, capitation (head 
tax) and gabelle (salt tax) as well as countless other taxes on land were sources of 
discontent that fueled the Revolution.  54  Social and economic relationships in France 
were changing.  However, the government was ill adapted to accommodate these 
changes. 
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The proximate cause of the French Revolution—that is, the third and most 
immediate trigger—was social pressure.  Pent-up tensions were brought to boil by an 
economic depression that created an excess of relatively well-educated or skilled artisans 
in competition for comparatively few jobs. In the spring and summer of 1789, the 
bankruptcy of the state unleashed a torrent of events.  The dissolution and reformation of 
the Estates General in 1789 challenged the aristocratic organization of French society.  
The July 14th storming of the Bastille demonstrated with picturesque violence how 
French social crisis leads to political crisis, an idea that finds purchase today.  Social and 
political change continued throughout the next years with the development of a 
constitutional monarchy in 1791.  Henceforth the French monarchs swore allegiance to 
the constitution, thus changing the government from an absolute monarchy to a balance 
of power between the king and the “people,” based on a constitution.  The advent of war 
in 1792 against the Habsburg Empire presented the fledgling French Republic with an 
opponent suffused in the structures and trappings of the ancien régime that France had 
just smashed at home.  Frenchmen, collectively, could identify themselves as a nation 
against a foreign adversary—and they had an ideological mission, as well.55 
War broke on France as the Royal Army dissolved into mutiny and desertion, 
prompting the new Republican government to declare the levée en masse.  This universal 
obligation of military service in support of the War of the First Coalition not only 
mobilized the French people, but also associated citizenship with the defense of the state.  
By 1793, France faced turmoil as the Republic was attacked from without and within.  
The Vatican foolishly supported the restoration of the monarchy, setting the stage for the 
church-state conflict, with all its present-day political import in France and the West. 56  
This rift is apparent in two aspects of French identity.  The traditionalists view 
Catholicism as integral to French history and reject as foreign, even heretical, such other 
Christian sects as Protestantism and Jansenism.  They abhor Republicanism and its 
offshoot, Freemasonry, as the province of socialists, Protestants, and Jews—none of 
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whom count as properly French.  French Republicans in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, on the other hand, saw the Church as repressive, encouraging 
rebellions of superstitious peasants in the Catholic west during the Revolution, and 
making alliances with foreign monarchs.  (In more modern times, they see the Church as 
reactionary at best; at worst, it is an opponent of free speech and tolerance.)  Therefore, 
from the first moments of modern French history, French values seem to pit liberty and 
freedom against tradition and order.  For some years after 1789, the two parties and their 
worldviews seemed irreconcilable. 
The Revolution was not over, and these conditions led to the rise of Napoleon 
Bonaparte.  This military leader was viewed as a reactionary “man of order” by some, 
and as the perfect representative of Revolutionary and progressive ideals to others.  
Napoleon capitalized on the social upheaval and political crisis within his country to 
stage a coup d’etat that created an authoritarian government in November 1799 (and 
ultimately became the First Empire in 1804).57  
From 1799, Napoleon assumed the role of supreme leader of France.  One of his 
first challenges was taming the Catholic Church. Historically, the church always 
rivaled—and in France, often eclipsed—the state for power and influence.  Even the 
Bourbon monarchs were careful to promote their own candidates for high clerical office 
and to maintain the independence of the Gallican Church from the influences of Rome.  
Relations between the church and the First Republic were stormy, as Napoleon, himself a 
child of the eighteen century and indifferent to religion, desired to harness the power of 
the Catholic revival in France to his own ends.  Peace was restored only with the July 
1801 Concordat with Pope Pius VII, through which the state regulated the practice of 
religion.  That is to say, Napoleon’s pledged to the Pope that his government recognized 
the “Catholic, Apostolic and Roman” faith as the confession of a majority of Frenchmen 
and that the French government would assure the freedom of the people to exercise their 
faith publicly.  As the historian Lucien Romier stated, “The Protestants, Calvinists, and  
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Lutherans in France received analogous advantages and submitted to similar discipline.  
Thus Bonaparte acquired the support of religion at the same time as he domesticated 
it.”58 
Meanwhile, Napoleon’s military victories reinforced French beliefs of grandeur 
that France was the world’s cultural and military leader.  He led the victorious French 
forces—now a national army through the levée en masse—in the War of the Second 
Coalition, which ended with the Treaty of Luneville in February 1801, with the 
Austrians; and the Treaty of Amiens in March 1802, with the British.  By the time of the 
War of the Third Coalition, the size and strength of Napoleon’s military forces 
overwhelmed his foes and spread the ideals of the French Revolution beyond the frontiers 
of France.  Now the French state—and the nation of Frenchmen—were becoming 
ethnically and linguistically united.  Moreover, Napoleon fused the state and nation, 
conceptually.59  In the First Empire, military service, coupled with a series of resounding 
armed victories, forged this sense of national unity.  
The Army became the chosen tool of the French government to promote the idea 
of the nation.  Initially, the Army was often the government’s official census, conducting 
operations throughout France and collecting information on its inhabitants.  In 1863, 
official French governmental studies demonstrated that 8,381 of France’s 37,510 
communities did not speak French.  Spoken French was actually a foreign language to a 
large portion of the population within the borders of France.60  The governance of France 
was conducted in French, thus, the military operated in French.  Operations within France 
often required translators, but more importantly, universal conscription would prove to be 
a vehicle of language dissemination.  Service in the French military equated to learning 
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the Republican values and the language.61  The Army became the “agency for 
emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis, civilization.”62  
This program of making France more thoroughly French was neither an accident 
nor an afterthought.  As Eugen Weber explains in his work Peasants into Frenchmen, 
“Frenchness” was not inherited, and the idea of a nation with shared norms and culture 
did not come about spontaneously.  These notions and attitudes had to be assiduously 
cultivated.  Just as nascent national pride aided Napoleon in his military and political 
efforts, particularly among neighboring European populations, the momentum of the 
national revolution carried France through the tumultuous developments of the nineteenth 
century, not least because Frenchness was fostered. These decades saw the growth of 
industrialization and the results of that growth: increased middle class, urbanization, and 
education. This era also marked the consolidation of the unified, coherent French national 
identity. 
For one thing, British ideas of industrialization and modernization reverberated in 
France, as entrepreneurs began to revolutionize French society and politics in their own 
fashion. The Industrial Age facilitated the growth of cities and an entrenchment of the 
growing middle class.  The migration of peoples from farm to factory and the subsequent 
population explosion required improved transportation and communications.63  “This 
growth of towns and trade would, sooner or later, disrupt the aristocratic society and 
whittle away its defense.  The growing class of merchants and bankers increased by trade 
and financial operations, tended to become absorbed by it, or at least to come to terms 
with it rather than to offer any resolute challenge.”64   
For the most part, however, the French authored their own national agenda.  The 
French government of the late nineteenth century diligently strove to eliminate the social 
fractionalization and regionalism that existed within the Hexagon. Regionalism was 
diminished with the creation of a transportation network and national media.  The 
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improvements of roads and the creation of rail facilitated a unified national market, as it 
permitted French peasants to venture beyond their villages, where they used to remain 
more attached to their local and regional identities than to some distant, Paris-focused 
French nation.  The fear of outsiders, including the government, as well as the persistence 
of myriad dialects, were two manifestations of regionalism.  Both of which made 
governance difficult and national unity questionable.  The creation of modern lines of 
communication assisted the government in conducting regional assessments and 
implementing universal conscription.65 (Additionally, peasants were required to 
communicate in French when conducting any business with the state or other Frenchmen, 
be it taxes, sales, or trade.)   
Especially from the 1880s, the education system rivaled the army as the principal 
vehicle through which an often-illiterate peasantry was brought into the national 
mainstream.  As with military service, when peasant children were required to attend 
school, they were inculcated with the values of the nation.  French education centered on 
the idea that the past had to be rewritten.  The creation of the national idea formed the 
cornerstone of French nationalism, beginning with a shared sense of a collective history.   
The schoolbooks of the Third Republic taught the foundations of Frenchness: “one 
people, one country, one government, one nation, one fatherland.”66  Just as roads and 
trails led to mobility and the spread of nationalist ideas and the state apparatus, the 
schools implanted these new beliefs in the future generations of Frenchmen.  Like the 
French military, schooling was compulsory.  The schoolteachers of the nineteenth 
century became the voice and ambassadors of the French Republic and also the 
“harbingers of enlightenment and of the Republican message that reconciled the 
benighted masses with a new world, superior in well-being and democracy.”67 
These schools also served as the heralds of secularism.  As teachers shared the 
beliefs of the Enlightenment and its universal values, the role of rural myths and the place 
of the church in public life diminished.  “The Church no longer symbolized the unity of 
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all, but stood for the domination of one particular faction.”68  In the event, the church and 
the state vied with each other to establish schools and win the loyalties of the population, 
a competition that culminated in the official separation of church and state in 1905.  
(Even very religious conservatives like Charles de Gaulle were forced to accept that the 
secular republic is the form of government that divides the French the least.) Equality 
became a basic tenet of the French identity, overcoming religion, regional affinities, and 
local languages.  
2. World War II: Glory or Triumph? 
The era of the Second World War in France, which began with the German 
invasion of 1940 and reached its nadir with the collusion of the Vichy regime with the 
Nazi occupiers, is often referred to as the “Dark Years.”  Led by Marshal Pétain, the hero 
of Verdun, the conservative French government, capitulated to Hitler in the hopes of 
settling scores with their left-wing rivals, whom they blamed for the defeat.  These 
conservatives believed that conspiring with the Nazis would serve as a prelude to 
regaining French grandeur in the postwar period.  In 1941, the conservative Charles 
Maurras wrote in La Seule France (The Only France) that “the government of the Army 
offers us the shining image of French unity.”  Maurras basked in the rule of Pétain, 
because he believed it offered France the opportunity to recover the pays réal, that is the 
“true France” uncorrupted by Republican ideas.69   
Catholic conservatives argued that the fall to the German invasion was 
punishment for the flawed final years of the Third Republic.  These Frenchmen believed 
that France had been undermined by socialism, communism, and defeatism.  Pétain, and 
those with whom he surrounded himself, believed they could “renew the True France of  
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their imaginations.”70  This government’s collaboration, they believed, would allow them 
to focus on those traditional aspects that made their nation great: culture, language, 
religion, and so on.71   
As the “capital” of unoccupied France until November 1942, Vichy had derisory 
powers and little influence.72  The grand collaborateurs believed that Hitler had, in fact, 
won the war, and thus, their collaboration would preserve France and its empire; 
therefore, allowing them to regenerate the nation in the postwar period.  Life in the 
Occupied Zone became a struggle for most Frenchmen.  The constant hunt for food and 
fuel, as well as the constant oppression by the occupiers, smacked of French failure, not 
renewal.  In reality, capitulation and collusion with the invaders required acquiescence to 
the “inglorious episodes” that included mass deportations of Jews, as well as harnessing 
French industry and France’s workforce in support of the Nazi New Order.  In the 
meantime, the Vichy police hunted down patriotic members of the Resistance.73 
Meanwhile, another French General, Charles de Gaulle, had escaped France and 
was building a government in exile in London.  While de Gaulle shared Pétain’s 
conservative views, the two generals differed on strategy.  De Gaulle believed that France 
was an exceptional nation.  He, too, had fought valiantly for the nation during the First 
World War, and was prepared to lead his nation to victory, albeit in a different fashion 
than his counterparts at Vichy.   De Gaulle proclaimed that “La France ne peut pas être 
La France sans grandeur,”74 (France cannot be France without grandeur), or that France 
could not reclaim its world status by submitting itself to Germany.  “As an adolescent I 
was convinced that France would have to go through gigantic trials,” de Gaulle wrote in 
his memoirs, “that the interest of life consisted in one day rendering her some signal 
service and that I would have the occasion to do so.”75  De Gaulle became the voice of 
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the Free French.  He encouraged Frenchmen around the French empire to retake their 
colonies from the Vichy regime.  Inside France he took the leadership of an incipient 
resistance movement with the support of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) 
and U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS).  French resistance efforts gained strength 
during the war and the Forces Françaises de l’Interieur (FFI) became a potent arm of the 
opposition as well as the source of de Gaulle’s wartime and post-war legitimacy.76   
On August 26, 1944, de Gaulle triumphantly returned to Paris to begin his 
campaign of rallying his people around their shared hardships and collective memories.77  
In de Gaulle’s view, Vichy had defiled French honor.  The reclamation of French honor 
and influence was crucial to de Gaulle’s mission.  “The country was moving forward; de 
Gaulle, as everybody knew, had triumphed in those war years, incarnating the essence of 
France with his refusal to collaborate. … [H]is version of the war’s aftermath—nothing 
of the country’s murky collabororationist regime subsisted, and France had been 
reborn—was the accepted one.”78  Despite retiring from office in 1946, Charles de Gaulle 
returned to the presidency in 1958 to continue his interrupted rescue of “French 
ascendancy” from its state of collaboration and decline in world stature.  During de 
Gaulle’s tenure, many of the modern ideas of what it means to be truly French were 
cemented into the French populace.  During these years of Charles de Gaulle’s 
presidency (1958-1973), the French Republic again began to feel as if it had regained its 
previous grandeur.79 
Modern France and its fundamental ideas began with the French Revolution.  
These ideas, cemented in the Enlightenment concepts of man, reason, and the association 
of free men take their inspiration from Rousseau’s Contrat Social and further with Ernst 
                                                 
76 Horne, 364. 
77 Ibid., 374-375. 
78 Adam Nossiter, The Algeria Hotel: France, Memory, and the Second World War. (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), 5. 
79 One of the most insightful accounts of this period is Philip Cerny’s The Politics of Grandeur: 
Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).  Another 
history that demonstrates the life of Charles de Gaulle in its entirety is Bernard Ledwidge’s history, De 
Gaulle. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1982).  This lengthy biography demonstrates how de Gaulle 
developed his views and love of France. 
 30
Renan’s “Qu’est ce qu’une nation?”80  The French believe that their nation is founded in 
universal values as well as France’s unique historical experience.  The lessons that they 
take away from this historical experience are that religion is separate from the 
government; France deserves and maintains a particular grandeur; and the school system 
serves as the means to inculcate French social beliefs in successive generations of French 
citizens.  These lessons form the framework for the current debate over the integration of 
Muslims into French society. 
Being French is central to the French identity itself.  It overcomes any other 
identity.  For Frenchmen, the Republic equates to citoyens, each entitled to the same 
rights.  As citoyens, Frenchmen expect everyone to share a dedication to the values of 
liberal democracy.  Thus, they will agree on basic principles and rights, procedures for 
democracy, and what is right constitutionally.  For the French, language acquisition and 
universal values are common themes of nationalism.   
Understanding how French identity has changed in the previous two to three 
decades incorporates the discussion of French colonial legacy in North Africa.  This 
legacy introduces the Muslim dynamic to the French identity and will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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III. LES MUSULMANS…FIERTE, MEMOIRE, IDENTITE, 
ISLAMAPHOBIE, DISCRIMINATIONS, EXTREMISMES81 
Has the tricolour changed from bleu, blanc, rouge, to noir, blanc, beur?82 
 
French notions of identity, developed over centuries and honed by such collective 
experiences as the Revolution and the German occupation, have been challenged by the 
arrival of a large Muslim population in France. France surely has absorbed newcomers 
throughout its past, but typically, this immigration entailed smaller influxes of people of 
European origin; these mini-waves often affected only one region at a time.  Muslims, 
too, have been coming to France in measurable numbers since the nineteenth century, but 
usually as temporary “guest workers” whose status presupposes a return to their home 
countries.   The rise of a significant, permanent Muslim minority has sparked concerns 
that Muslims in France will not assimilate, but instead will reshape French identity until 
it becomes unrecognizable to French de souche.83  This chapter examines the Muslim 
minority in France as a political—and politically active force—as well as the impact of 
French Muslims on the ongoing national debate on the character and essence of French 
national identity is the subject of this chapter. 
A. FRANCE IN ALGERIA; MUSLIMS IN FRANCE 
Based on the universalist principles of the Republic, French laws since 1789 have 
insisted on the avoidance of ethnic or racial categories on state and other official 
documents.  Despite these universalist ideas, categorization has always occurred within 
the society of France.  As early as 1798, during the Napoleonic expedition in Egypt, the 
emperor himself reflected on the challenges of integrating Muslim subjects into the 
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French empire.84  Tyler Stovall, professor of the University of California at Berkeley, has 
noted that “the genius of France is that it tends to assimilate those it administers to.”  
During its colonial empire and thereafter, France elevated “those it colonized to the level 
of French citizens, even French thinkers.”85  This elevation was only partial, however, 
and subject to periodic restatement. 
The colonization of African regions and the attendant immigration of non-
Europeans into France created new delineations within French nationalism. With these 
extensive contacts with peoples of visibly different races, faiths, and cultural conventions, 
Frenchmen began to distinguish between French citizens and French subjects.  Algeria 
presented a special case, however, in no small part because of the way in which the 
French set about establishing dominion over this northern African region after the 
Conquest of Algeria in 1830.  In 1848 Algeria became a French territory, introducing 
different types of subjects to the French community.  These groups included but were not 
limited to European colonists, Jews, and Algerians.   
The basic problem for any imperial power was how to pacify a diverse foreign 
peoples with a numerically inferior force.  Cultural anxiety, that is to say, a lack of 
understanding of those to be colonized, fueled and shaped the colonizers’ response, 
which typically entailed co-opting a portion of an indigenous culture to facilitate the 
colonization and governance of the colony.  For the French in Algeria, this tactic entailed 
the use of Berbers, or tribal Algerians outside the predominant Arab population, as their 
agents and allies in the colonial proposition.  Like the Catholics in North Vietnam, the 
collusion of the minority Berbers with their French occupiers let the Berbers gain status 
and let the French gain control.  Collusion of this sort had peculiar ramifications for 
Algerian immigration to France and the racial/cultural relations that attended this 
population shift. 
The ethnic distinction between Arabs and Berbers forms the basis of the “Kabyle 
Myth,” which held that not only were Arabs and Berbers always at war, but  Arabs were 
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lazy and slow, while Berbers were practical, not overly religious, and hardworking—thus 
they could be assimilated into France.86  Indirectly, the Kabyle Myth led to the initial 
anti-Arab/anti-Islam racism in France.  The Berbers served as assistants to the colonists, 
les Pieds Noirs, who became the leaders of Algeria. Immigration was encouraged 
initially.  In the 1860s, however, the Second Empire discouraged all immigration and 
attempted to establish a Royaume Arabe, or Arab Kingdom, by installing families loyal to 
Charles X in Algeria.87  In order to ensure loyalty in the young country, legislators 
crafted laws to naturalize children born in France to ensure those children would attend 
school, and, like the peasant children of provincial France in these same years, become 
attached to the nation.  Subsequent laws also eliminated various privileges previously 
available to foreigners in order to encourage foreigners to strive to become French.88  
The 1865 Senatus Law granted rights to Algerians, but did not provide native 
political representation or the ability to hold public office.89  This law inaugurated the 
entrenchment of racism in the French society, because although the Algerians were 
technically part of metropolitan France, the citizens of Algeria were not truly French.  In 
1889, the Third Republic reaffirmed jus soli (Latin for “right of the soil/territory”), 
affirming that being born in France, to include French territories, equated to French 
nationality.  For colonists and the colonized, this nationality came in two varieties: 
Frenchmen born outside of France to one native French parent; or those born in France of 
two non-native parents.  Jus soli meant that nationality was merely a prerequisite to 
citizenship.90   
From the 1830s through the 1960s, France asserted that Algeria was not just a 
colony but also a French national territory.  Native-born Algerians were considered 
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national subjects for the preponderance of the colonial period.91  These Algerians became 
the primary influx of Muslim immigrants into continental France. 
Muslim immigration into France largely began in the 1920s.  The French 
government allowed Algerians, as members of the French colonial empire, to enter 
France as an expression of the country’s gratitude to the Algerian soldiers who had 
fought valiantly on behalf of the French during World War I.  In the interwar period, the 
French government thanked these French “patriots” with residence in the Hexagon, as 
well as the construction of the Grande Mosque of Paris and the Muslim Hospital.  Also 
during the 1920s, idea of Islam á la Française emerged.  Proponents of this Republican 
idea coined the phrase “evolués,” referring to those Muslims worthy of citizenship—
Algerians who were assimilated, or “sufficiently civilized.”92 
Amid the long history of French colonialism, the most significant effects of the 
idea of Françité on Muslims in contemporary France were developed in the post-World 
War II era.  On the one hand, in the years immediately after 1945, French elites viewed 
the colonial empire as the realm in which France would rediscover her greatness.  In the 
art and film of the period, writers, directors, and painters alike praise colonization.  As 
such, policymakers and large swathes of the public alike rejected any suggestion of 
abandoning territory in the French empire as a measure tantamount to national failure.93 
The formulation of post-Vichy immigration policy focused on remaining “color 
blind.” Although social scientists made such recommendations after the war, French 
legislators refused to promulgate any references to place of origin, race or ethnicity.   The 
French Republic remained confident that it could turn any person, regardless of social 
status or race, into a Frenchman.94 
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This belief continued, at least on the official level, with the expansion of Muslim 
migration after World War II, when the European Community required guest workers to 
facilitate the reconstruction of European countries. Muslim immigrants were mostly day 
laborers.  They were not middle-class, with all the associated characteristics of upward 
mobility, predictable consumerism, and an interest in conforming to the conventions of 
Frenchness in order to get ahead.  Mainly male; confined to cheap hotels or bleak 
dormitories in the banlieues, they did not become part of the French society.  Everyday 
Frenchmen viewed these immigrants not as equals, but as guest-workers to be tolerated.   
At the same time, although shunned French Muslims increasingly became a 
feature of French life. From the assimilation of the World War One Muslim veterans 
through the Second World War, African Frenchmen served in cabinet-level positions. 
Even amid the military and governance challenges in Algeria at the height of the Algerian 
crisis, from 1958 to 1962, the French Parliament contained a 9.5 percent Algerian 
representation, more or less or less proportionate to the Algerian population in 
metropolitan France.  This representation ended in 1962 with the independence of 
Algeria. 
B. THE ALGERIAN TRAVAILS 
Other scholars have treated the evolution of France’s North African colonies in 
detail; thus the historiography of this subject is summarized here only in brief.95  
Significant to the modern essence of Frenchness, however, are the events in Algeria and 
North Africa, which have shaped the modern French mind and affected the demographics 
of the Hexagon. Understanding the French psyche and its relations with and history in 
Africa will facilitate an understanding of contemporary French issues. 
In the decade or so after World War II, the French government was faced with 
multiple events on the world stage that continued to diminish her status in the new, post-
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World War II world, notably the conflict in Indochina,96 and the even more desperate and 
destructive war in Algeria.97 The rise of Arab nationalism, which precipitated the Suez 
Crisis of 1956, spread throughout North Africa.  Encouraged by the French defeat at Dien 
Bien Phu, Tunisia and Morocco, two French colonies, demanded French withdrawal, 
with popular uprisings to underscore the point.  Within half a year of Dien Bien Phu, 
concerted revolt broke out in the French département of Algeria.  On November 1, 1954, 
the French Republic found itself facing the beginning of “the events in Algeria.”98  On 
All Saints’ Day Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) guerrillas attacked Algerian 
military installations, police posts, warehouses, communications facilities, and public 
utilities throughout the country.  Simultaneously, the FLN used radio in Cairo to 
broadcast an announcement demanding that Algerian Muslims rise up in the nationwide 
fight for the “restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within 
the framework of the principles of Islam.” 
The reaction in Paris of François Mitterand, the French Minister of Interior, 
embraced armed suppression of the Algerian insurgents to French rule.  This idea was 
echoed throughout the nation, as political elites affirmed the belief that Algeria was a 
French département.99  As the FLN’s Armée de Libération Nationale continued its 
symbolic attacks, Frenchmen realized the significance of these actions as an assault on 
the essence of the nation.  These FLN offenses were the first time since 1830 that 
Algerians had coordinated attacks against French rule.  Such an assault on French 
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territory, albeit in North Africa, coming immediately on the heels of the Dien Bien Phu 
humiliation, caused an upwelling of nationalistic sentiment.   
French offensive operations in Algeria continued for almost eight years.  Like the 
French Indochina Campaign, the Algerian War drained French finances and manpower, 
while dividing the society both politically and racially.  From 1956 through 1962, French 
elites installed numerous affirmative-action type policies,100 in an ill-fated attempt to 
right some of the previous injustices upon the indigenous peoples.101  In 1958, in 
response to problems within Algeria, the French government granted full citizenship to 
the Algerians.  In May of that year, the “merry go round of collapsing governments” that 
was the Fourth Republic finally ended, as a result of foreign misadventures, as well as the 
protraction of the Algerian War.102  The void in government led to the return of Charles 
de Gaulle as the first president of the Fifth Republic. 
De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic extended universal suffrage to Algerian men and 
women with local civil status, or those Algerians who were employed in the civil or 
military posts open to them.  This accommodation represented a shift from assimilation to 
integration as a matter of policy, that is to say, that suffrage for Algerians would lead 
them to become French citizens both as voters and as Frenchmen.  At the most basic level 
in 1958, Charles de Gaulle knew he could not win in Algeria by military means alone.  
He thus needed to find the optimal political solution.  In addition to his program to ensure 
governmental positions to Algerian Muslims, de Gaulle worked to regain control of his 
generals in Algeria, who had become pro-Algerian French.  He also strove to 
compromise with the Pieds Noirs103 in order to maintain control of natural resources and 
nuclear testing areas within Algeria that were vital to metropolitan French interests and 
security concerns.  He then invested millions of French francs into the Algerian economy 
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to promote development with his “Constantine Plan,” the goal of which was to convince 
the Algerian Muslim population that their best economic interests were to be had in a 
coupling with France.104  In 1962, he decided to withdraw and isolate the former colony 
politically, while socially reaffirming Frenchness at home and within the international 
system.  De Gaulle believed that the French “dance on a European Stage, not an African 
one. …[W]e are the leaders of Europe.”  Such sentiments elevated the French in their 
own eyes; however, such policies also promoted further racism and ostracism at the time 
and in the period that has followed.105   
Despite de Gaulle’s initiatives, the dilemma faced by the French government 
remained how to promote genuine liberal rights—the innate rights of citizens—within the 
colonies in the midst of a race and cultural war.  Determining whether Algerians were 
French citizens would require a broadening of the ideal of the French nation and citizen 
from the national ideal of the nineteenth century, as well as a sharp transformation from 
the kind of cultural-nationalist and integral-nationalist excesses of the era of the Dreyfus 
scandal or the Vichy government’s collaboration with the Holocaust.  “France’s 
confrontation with the Algerian Revolution accelerated France’s efforts to define the 
identities of the people of Algeria and to do so in ways that both guaranteed French rule 
and coincided with Republican principles.”106   
At least until the war dragged on, the French had viewed Algeria as the idealized 
initial colonie de peuplement.  The idea that the most significant French colony would 
share rights as subjects of the Empire, travel to and work in the Hexagon thus made 
Algeria unique in its status.107  The events in Algeria engendered a collective French 
distaste for Algeria, as well as an aversion toward Africans.  Frenchmen began to view 
the Algeria situation as a pending or even ongoing defeat of France, while the French 
economic boom in the 1960s led to more immigration into the Hexagon.  These 
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simultaneous occurrences led to the “idea of vicious and treacherous Arabs.”108  Beliefs 
of an ungrateful, bloodthirsty, and extremely different peoples, both culturally and 
religiously, grew amongst Frenchmen throughout the years following the French 
withdrawal from Algeria.  The failure of policy and arms in Algeria not only hampered 
French illusions of grandeur, but lead to intolerance in French society where the echoes 
of racism and even genocide were not so faint granted the experience of the age of 
imperialism and total war. 
The idea of intolerance to a race was nothing new for Europeans in general and 
the French in particular.  As Tyler Stovall articulated, there exists in France significant 
intolerance to non-French races, even while racism remains a taboo concept in the French 
universalist discourse of the ideal citizen and society.  In lieu of intolerance, Frenchmen 
use such words as “immigration” and “immigrants” to refer to Africans, mostly 
Algerians.  Stovall argues that this racism is seated in the history of the Algerian conflict, 
an “unresolved dispute” with a “bad legacy.”109  He continues that the “genesis of 
conceptual constructions produced to represent North African immigrants and their 
evolution within French society” led to the idea of the nationalist and the foreigner.  
These terms were believed to be a “new construction,”  though it is not new at all.  
Stovall depicts this “new” racism as a result of historical amnesia, where French 
nationalism rebuked the “other” throughout its Republican history.110  Signally, despite 
the ideals of secularism that characterized modern French-ness did not apply outside of 
France.  The French government in Algeria often colluded with the Church to operate 
schools and medical centers—and to facilitate conversion to Christianity as part of 
colonization.111   
The Algerian war, like the French Revolution, compelled a reassessment of the 
meaning of French citizenship amid crisis.112  Although the phrase Algeria c’est la 
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France echoed throughout the 1950s, most continental Frenchmen abandoned it at the 
turn of the decade, specifically in 1962.  Many believed the troubles in Algeria were 
overwhelming the French state and les pieds noirs began to be viewed more and more as 
European Algerians who became less and less French. On March 18, 1962, after years of 
horrific and dirty internal conflict, culminating in an attempted French military coup,113 
the French government signed the Evian accords with leaders of the FLN.  The basis of 
these accords was the French recognition of Algerians as different from other French 
citizens.  The FLN delegation stated that Algerians required an independent state for the 
peoples of “Arab culture, Berber roots, and Islamic tradition.”  Before 1962, French 
politicians had disputed this social difference. With the Evian Accords, however, the 
French leadership and the French public “announced” the segregation of the former 
department. The agreement also put the lie to the cherished ideal of a unified national 
identity, while insisting on a singular Frenchness, which the Algerians rejected as the 
metropolitan French rescinded it in the Evian Accords. 
As Todd Shepherd remarked, de Gaulle’s actions solved the immediate political 
problem; however, by answering where the “question of colonization ends” only begged 
the question of where immigration begins.114  The popular French anticipation of 1962 
was that Muslim Algerian immigrants would presently leave the Hexagon, and that 
French Algerians would not return to continental Europe. 115 The resistance in 
Africa/Algeria was mostly religious and fostered an “us versus them” mindset.  The 
majority of Algerians who had French citizenship in March of 1962—approximately 9  
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million—had it revoked in 1963.  These Muslims became “Algerians” (Algerians of 
Muslim origin), though a minority of these persons (nearly 1 million) was called 
European.  
C. MUSLIMS IN FRANCE TODAY   
De Gaulle and his government reshaped the vision that French citizens had both 
of themselves and of the “others.”  “A France without Algeria signified a clean victory 
for republican values and not evidence that putting values premised in universalism into 
practice, institutionalizing them in the French republics, had depended on denying rights 
to a certain people: in this case, Muslims.”116  Still, the Fifth Republic was unable to 
successfully integrate Muslims and thus created the segregation and racism found in the 
contemporary idea of a wholly” European republic.117 
After waging the brutal counter-guerilla campaign in North Africa in the 1950s 
and 1960s, France opened its borders to many Arab North Africans.  These Muslims 
came to France for many reasons, though two predominate.  First, many North Africans 
who were loyal to the French were no longer welcome in their newly independent 
countries, and they came to France seeking the shelter of the culture and institutions they 
supported.  Many others came in search of economic prosperity relative to their countries 
of origin. 118  Thus, Muslim immigration and the French perception of these immigrants 
primarily continued along the lines of the Kabyle Myth.  Frenchmen continued to harbor 
the belief of Arabs as dangerous and untrustworthy.  The Français de souche saw these 
Arabs as different, both culturally and religiously, as well as a people whose practices in 
the home were drastically different from their own.  (Key structures such as family 
relations and differing views on women’s rights further encouraged these beliefs.) 
In the 1970s and 1980s, French society further changed.  Until the late 1970s, 
most émigrés expected them to return to their countries of origin; their French “hosts” 
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tended to have the same aspirations for them.119  A drastic change occurred in Algeria, 
however, which up-ended these plans for many.  The newly independent African nation 
with socialist inclinations endeavored to develop its economy, and it chose to use 
immigration as political tool.  The Algerian government unilaterally cancelled all 
immigration to France.  The government within the Hexagon responded by deporting 
Algerian guest workers, or by offering them incentives to depart the European continent.  
However, most of these immigrants chose to stay in France, as their children spoke 
French and they had limited ties to the African nation.  Many of these former Algerians 
were peasants, who viewed returning to a socialist-policy regime as a lesser option.  The 
fear of returning to socialist Algeria, coupled with their meager standard of living, 
convinced the majority to remain in France.   
Indeed, throughout the 1970s, France’s Muslim population continued to grow, 
despite the imposition of “zero tolerance” immigration laws.   (Unemployment was 
soaring in France, a situation only exacerbated by the return of native French workers 
from Algeria, especially after Algeria nationalized its energy resources.)  Although these 
stiffer controls were put in place to stem the flow of African immigrants, the Muslim 
population within France continued to swell due to illegal immigration, high birth rates, 
and an exception within the policy that permitted family reunification.120   
During this period, the term “beur” entered the French lexicon to replace 
“imigré,” as Frenchmen realized that the imigrés were not going to return to their original 
countries.  Beur refers to French national children of North African immigrants, who 
became a significant and visible part of French society in the 1960s–1980s, as they 
attempted to negotiate the problems of being French nationals but not citizens.  This 
ubiquitous and exclusionary term demonstrates the persistence of colonialism, racism, 
and social stratification, despite the inclusive and universalist rhetoric of Republicanism.  
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This structural hostility toward North Africans, mostly toward Arabs and Muslims, 
continues in all facets of French society.121  
Indeed, in the 1950s, the French government in Algeria attempted to gain popular, 
international support by demonstrating Algerian Muslim women without veils.  A 
choreographed show in May of 1958 featured the liberation of Muslim women via their 
“unveiling” accompanied by the phrase Kif kif les françaises (“Let’s be like the French 
women”).122  In many respects, this episode presages the “Battle of the Veil” that rages in 
France today. 
Even amid the discriminatory and exclusionary measures, Muslim immigration, 
both legal and illegal, has feverishly continued.  Today, the French Muslim population 
consists primarily of Muslims from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.  Of the 62.3 million 
people in France, approximately 5 million–6 million, or 8 percent to 10 percent, of the 
total population is Muslim.  The French Muslim population is the largest in Western 
Europe.123  Half of this population is compromised of French citizens.124 
D. THE FRENCH HEADSCARF 
There are many types of Muslim immigrants in France.  In addition to the 
diversity of ethnic groups that comprise the Muslim population within France, there are 
many types of headscarves.  The two most popular are the hijab, first, and the niqaab.  
The meaning of hijab is curtain or partition. It is a scarf that generally covers the hair and 
conceals the neck. It leaves the face exposed and does not cover the bosom. The niqaab 
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covers the hair, forehead and face, but leaves an opening for the eyes. It is particularly 
prevalent in south Asia.125 The hijab is the most pervasive in France.  
Patrick Weil, one of the members of the Stasi Commission, described the five 
reasons that women in France wear the veil, as the Commission found.  First, Weil stated 
that many women wear headscarves because their oppressive male relatives require them 
to don a head covering.  The headscarf as a symbol of male oppression was also echoed 
in an ABC Foreign Correspondent news story.  An Iranian-born writer who was 
interviewed equated the hijab to the yellow star that Jews were forced to wear by the 
Nazis.  She sees the scarf as “the symbol with authorizes violence towards women, that 
defines women as sub-human.”126   
Some Muslim women see the scarf in exactly opposite terms.  Instead of a symbol 
of oppression, many women see the symbol as an articulation of free belief, or the ability 
simply to practice what they believe.  These young women view the headscarf as a “free 
outward expression of identity during a young woman’s exploration of her religious 
commitment.”127  In the same vein, some see the hijab a symbol of righteousness and 
purity, “thereby gaining respect in their local community.”128   
Still other Muslims view the head covering as important to their safety, as a form 
of protection against male pressure.  Many of these women believe wearing the scarf is a 
paradoxical “form of liberation from familial constraints and a way to avoid the macho 
rebukes of brothers concerned with their sister’s chastity.”129  Distinct from the oft-
revealing French and other European styles of dress, for these Muslims the hijab is a 
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“coat of armor, shielding them from the jeering comments and sexual harassment which 
sometimes comes from men in public places.”130 
The Stasi Commission found, as a fourth reason, that the young Muslim 
population was returning to the cultures of their countries of origins.  Many of these 
young Muslims said they believed their parents had become too French, while they 
themselves did not feel French.  They wear the headscarf as an expression of identity and 
freedom against secular parents.   
Similarly, the final reason identified by the Stasi Commission was that for some 
Muslim women, the headscarf was not just a return to their legacy, but additionally a 
statement of opposition to western and secular society.  These women believe that 
Western society pressures women into wearing revealing clothes and looking glamorous.  
These women, instead, believe that wearing a hijab “forces men to respect them for their 
intellect and abilities, not their looks.”131 
Dr. Zachary Shore adds that the trend of wearing a veil is often construed to mean 
a return to militancy. Shore also notes that the trend is growing among Muslim youth, 
and adds fashion as one desire for wearing a head covering.  He states in his book that 
“enough French Muslims wear colorful designer headscarves that instead of being called 
by its actual name ‘tchador,’ some have nicknamed it a ‘tchadior’ after the famous 
designer, Christian Dior.”132    
The headscarf has become a symbol to many French citizens in a society where 
symbols are held dear.  The reverence for symbols—for example, the tricolour, which is 
rooted in the French Constitutions of 1946 and 1958, as the national emblem of the 
Republic; or the fair, white Marianne, who represents fairness, bravery, and triumph—is 
as much a part of French culture as Republican values, fine wine, and elegant cheeses. 
The headscarf and the Muslim girls who wear it have become to be viewed as challenges 
to everything French. In the event, the French response to Muslim headscarves in their 
                                                 




midsts is profoundly un-French, if one takes the ideals of the Enlightenment and the 
Revolution at their word.  Though the French state has enforced social and economic 
participation throughout history, the modern “Headscarf Debate” manifests a lack of 
participation.  The French state and its society advocate liberté, égalité, and fraternité, 
but is it only for those who subscribe to the one true vision of Frenchness? 
 
 47
IV. INTEGRATION OR SEGREGATION? 
Prejudice is the greatest friend of extremists. … The more anti-Islam 
sentiment is expressed, the more it will drive people into the arms of 
extremists.133 
 
The Muslim population in France is a prominent and permanent fixture, which 
continues to expand.  Current demographics indicate that by 2015, Europe’s Muslim 
population will double, whereas Europe’s non-Muslim population is projected to fall by 
at least 3.5 percent.  The majority of European Muslims will reside in France.134  For this 
reason, the current challenge to French society—how to integrate or assimilate its 
Muslims and accommodate Islam—will only become more urgent.135  As a 
parliamentary democracy, the Fifth Republic has turned increasingly to legislation to 
manage the friction caused by the growth of the Muslim population.  The 2003 ban on 
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headscarves in French schools is the most controversial measure.136  The real question is 
whether such measures promote Muslim integration by forcing Muslims to accept the 
historic secularism of the Republic, or whether they are measures designed to exclude 
Muslims.  Furthermore, if France is an inclusive and tolerant society, then are such laws 
as the hijab ban fundamentally un-French?   
Integration is a process through which immigrants move into a culture and adopt 
its norms, conventions and way of life.137  That is not to say that integrating newcomers 
are required to relinquish all of their own customs or identities.  But the government and 
society expect that immigrants and their children will understand and accept particular 
practices (speaking French, say) and, more importantly, obey the laws of the land.  
French law mandates the separation of church and state, just as official secularism forms 
part of the French Republican values.   
As the second chapter of this thesis details, when the French Republic defined 
laïcité, as a fundamental principle, the national school system, along with the army of the 
Republic, was expected to propagate this ideal.  The French school system of that period 
put into practice “the clear distinction between church and state.”138  Today, when these 
Third-Republic-versus-the-Church conflicts are less prominent, school headmasters sit 
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dutifully at the gates of school grounds to ensure young Muslims remove their head 
coverings before entering the state-controlled facilities.   
The Moroccan-born French scholar of Islam, Rachid Benzine, believes the French 
concept of secularism fails to understand the new challenges of cultural and religious 
diversity.  “The problem is whether France can accept that former colonial subjects can 
be French.”  He writes, “[C]an an Arab really be French?  We have a common past of 
conflict.  We are unable to forgive each other.  The wound of the Algerian conflict has 
not healed.  So it’s hard to live together and create a common project.”139 
A. THE STASI COMMISSION AND THE RISE OF ISLAMAPHOBIA 
In 2002, as a result of recent media coverage of violence in schools, the president 
of the French National Assembly convened a commission to study “religious symbols in 
schools.”140  Shortly thereafter, President Chirac appointed the Stasi Commission, which 
was given a significantly wider scope—laícité throughout society.  The Stasi 
Commission—named after its chief researcher, Bernard Stasi—consisted of school 
officials, academics, politicians, businesspersons, and civil servants from all religious 
affiliations, political opinions, and national origins.141  The far-reaching Stasi 
Commission interviewed hundreds of citizens, reviewed French law, and took testimony 
from members of all social strata in order to determine the state of secularism within 
French society.   
Throughout 2002 and 2003, anti-Islamic fundamentalism was on the rise within 
French society in response to what many French citizens saw as a “France-wide strategy 
pursued by fundamentalist groups who use public schools as their battleground.”142  
Fears of Islamic terrorists had been growing throughout France for more than a 
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decade.143  In December of 1994, the Algerian terrorist organization, the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA), brazenly hijacked an Air France plane with the intention of blowing it up 
over Paris or flying it into the Eiffel Tower.  Although French Special Forces troops 
eventually boarded the jet and killed all four Algerian hijackers, the event resulted in the 
death of three passengers and widespread international media attention.144  Coverage of 
the event led to a European-wide fear that Islamic terrorists would destroy a plane over 
Paris.  On July 25, 1995, four GIA members—all French citizens—bombed the Paris 
Metro in an apparent attempt to dissuade the French government and its constituents from 
supporting the government in Algeria.  These showy attacks by Islamic extremists in the 
heart of Paris led the French body politic to rethink its support of the regime in Algiers.  
Additionally, the French population began to worry about their Muslim neighbors.145  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, further fueled this incipient fear of Muslim 
immigrants in France.    
A spectre is haunting Europe.  This is not the spectre of communism to 
which Marx and Engels were referring but rather the spectre of Islam and 
Islamic ‘terrorism’…around the time of the attack on the Twin Towers in 
New York. … Islam and Muslims had generally had a bad press in the 
West well before that time, but that tragedy has dramatically worsened the 
situation.146 
“Islamaphobia” is the term that many authors use to describe non-Muslims’ fear 
of Muslims as fanatics or terrorists destined to cause violence within society.  Within 
France, Islamaphobia was stoked in the 1980s and 1990s by the actions of the GIA and 
other North African terror organizations; this phobia drastically increased in the latter 
half of the 1990s and the early years of the new century as terrorists touting Islamic 
extremism brazenly attacked both physical targets and persons throughout Western 
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society.  The September 11 attacks in the United States and the murder of Theo Van 
Gogh in Holland took their place in the French psyche alongside the GIA attacks inside 
the borders of France in the 1990s as still more—and more terrifying—Islamic 
terrorism.147   
In this connection, many French citizens began to realize that the failure of French 
society to integrate an ever-expanding Muslim immigrant population would continue to 
have significant repercussions in and for the country.  Thus the Stasi Commission began 
its labor throughout the Republic to determine the extent and health of laïcité as well as 
such far-reaching and more difficult questions as the successes and failures of 
immigration policies, integration, assimilation, nationality laws, religious holidays, and 
so on.  After four months of public hearings, travel, and research the Commission 
endorsed a report with twenty-five different measures, including a ban on all conspicuous 
religious symbols in public schools.  Of the twenty-five recommendations, President 
Chirac chose to implement only the ban on religious symbols.148 
Commission member Patrick Weil said: 
[A]fter we heard the evidence, we concluded that we faced a difficult 
choice with respect to young Muslim girls wearing the headscarf in state 
schools.  Either we left the situation as it was, and thus supported a 
situation that denied freedom of choice to those—a very large majority—
who do not want to wear the headscarf; or we endorsed a law that removed 
freedom of choice from those who do want to wear it.  We decided to give 
freedom of choice to the former during the time they were in school, while 
the latter retain all their freedom for life outside school.  ... [C]omplete 
freedom of choice was, unfortunately, not an offer.  This was less a choice 
between freedom and restriction than a choice between freedoms; our 
commission was responsible for advising on how such freedoms should 
both be guaranteed and limited in the best interests of all.149 
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The Commission studied the reasons that young Muslims wear the veil; however, 
they also heard testimony from those young women who choose not to cover their heads.  
The Commission found that in the two to three years before they began their work, a 
trend had surfaced within many schools.  In schools where some girls wore the scarf and 
others did not, there was “strong pressure on the latter to ‘conform’.  This daily pressure 
takes different forms, from insults to violence.”150  The Commission members also 
received testimony from Muslim men who had paid to transfer their daughters from 
public schools to private, Catholic schools in order to alleviate the pressure on their 
daughters to cover.151  Commission members believed they found a clear majority of 
schoolgirls who did not wear the hijab; thus the commission recommended its removal 
from school grounds.   
The goal of the Commission’s findings and President Jacque Chirac’s decision 
was to limit social exclusion. The underlying belief held that such laws as the headscarf 
ban advance the integration of a population. When he announced the implementation of 
the ban, Chirac said, “I refuse to take France in that direction,”152 meaning 
communautarisme, or the situation when ethnic or religious groups segregate themselves 
and form their own individual states within a state.  The French had legislated integration 
in the recent past, arguably with good results.  As sociologist Abdelmaled Sayad153 wrote 
in The Suffering of the Immigrant,154 French laws of decades ago created a situation that 
promoted the integration of Algerians.  Although these Algerians could not have applied 
for citizenship individually, when they were automatically granted nationality in France, 
they were “discreetly satisfied” that their citizenship was “imposed by law.”  He further 
wrote 
 [French] nationality … occurred by itself, as a constraint collectively 
imposed: it is a condition shared by all, not by the result of individual or 
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voluntary acts. … Despite protestations of all sorts that are the “right thing 
to proclaim,” despite the guilt or simple unease that continues to be felt by 
the naturalized, this “forced” naturalization finally produces something 
like a satisfaction which, for a whole series of reasons, asks to remain 
secret and, sometimes, resigned to.155 
This discourse of social exclusion and inclusion continued after the Commission 
findings were announced and later implemented.  Although rallies and protests began 
throughout Europe and the Middle East as Muslim women demanded the right to wear 
the veil, many more women supported the law.156  As one interviewer found, fifteen-
year-old Siham said that she believed that “some teachers would not see beyond the scarf 
and judge us.  It’s best if we have to take it off.”  Rama Kourouma, a French Muslim high 
school student said with a smile that “faith is in the heart” and agreed that religion should 
not be propounded in school through symbols.157  French social scientist Jonathan 
Laurence said, “The ban can thus be seen as part of a larger effort to reduce the further 
development of certain religious inclinations and to prevent the potential development of 
dual loyalties among France’s Muslim population—a development that the government 
fears is being stoked by transnational pressures.”158 
B. EFFECTS OF THE LAW ON CONTEMPORARY FRENCH SOCIETY 
Determining the post-implementation impacts of the ban on society in France in 
these initial years is a task that poses particular challenges to the researcher.  This study 
focuses on the direct impact as can be measured in institutions of education and the 
impacts on public opinion.  For one thing, the ban is in its infancy, so only the most 
immediate effects are in evidence now.  For another thing, while students of similar 
social questions in America readily can look to records of incidents, enrollments, 
suspensions, expulsions, and other school and public sources, French law prohibits any 
                                                 
155 Weil, 3. 
156 According to a poll in the 2004 Economist article “France Divided over Headscarf Ban.” 
http://economist.com/ (accessed November 17, 2006) 3; while only 42 percent of the Muslim population in 
France supported the ban, 49 percent of Muslim women supported it. 
157 “Headscarf Defeat Riles French Muslims.” 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/4395934.stm (accessed 
November 21, 2006) 
158 Laurence and Vaisse, 166-167. 
 54
identification of it citizens on the basis of national origin, race, or religion, which means 
that the records are incomplete for such an inquiry.159   
Nonetheless, some evidence does support some initial conclusions about the ban.  
Overall so far, the headscarf ban seems to have had little impact on the society.  It has 
been enduringly popular.  Every political party has endorsed the ban, and according to a 
recent Pew survey, 75 percent of French citizens support the ban.160  Most tellingly, no 
Muslim group in France has opposed the ban.  Not even the Organization of Islamic 
Organizations of France (UOIF), the Muslim organization with the most prominence 
among the urban, poorer (and presumably more radicalized) populations, has requested a 
repeal of the law.161  Andrée Feillard, an Indonesian who resides in France, wrote that 
“statistics indicate that about 80 percent of Muslim women in France do not wear 
headscarves.  Hence, only 20 percent wear headscarves.”  In the same article, Syafiq 
Hasyim, the Deputy Director for the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism, was 
quoted to the effect that the majority of Muslim figures in French society believe the 
headscarf is not an important religious matter.162 Statements such as these may 
demonstrate a level of Europeanization or French influence on the Islam practiced in 
France.   
Some figures still oppose the law, though they support the French legal and 
political system.  Rachid Hamoudi, the UOIF leader and director of a mosque in Lille, 
said “The law is unfair to Muslims, but we’ve put it behind us.”163  Statements like that 
of Mr. Hamoudi can be interpreted several ways—indifference, apathy, disgust, or 
potentially as a sign of acceptance of a democratic decision.  In other words, all dissent 
about the ban does not correlate directly with fundamentalist or radical or terroristic 
agendas. 
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Statistics from schools in France since the ban reveal the minimal effects of the 
headscarf restriction even on the realm in which it was supposed to matter, namely the 
French education system.  A political officer at the United States Embassy in Paris164 
stated that no significant change has occurred in suspensions or expulsions related to the 
wearing of religious symbols in French public schools.  The officer focuses his daily 
attention on the Muslim dynamic within French society, and he stated that, in the course 
of his work, he had interviewed many Parisian headmasters and found no significant 
problems with the implementation of the ban.  He also stated that during his daily perusal 
of local media outlets since the ban, he had been unable to find a substantial amount of 
media coverage of any incidents involving a suspension or expulsion.165  In Muslim Girls 
and the Other France, Trica Keaton adds,  “Even more striking are the results of a survey 
reported by Le Monde, which showed that 91 percent of teachers polled had never been 
confronted by a ‘veiled’ student in the schools where they teach, while a reported 65 
percent had never seen a ‘veiled’ girl in their class in their career.  And yet 76 percent of 
teachers polled favored the law.”166 
No currently available information on enrollment rates at public schools suggests 
any significant change in enrollments that one might ascribe to the headscarf ban.  Private 
school enrollment in France has increased slightly since 2004.167  Unfortunately, French 
law prohibits determining the nationality of these new private school students. The most 
meaningful source from which conclusions might be drawn are requests for private, 
Muslim school construction and/or openings.  In France, all schools, public or private, are 
subject to monitoring of curriculum in accordance with the national curriculum and safety 
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regulations, as well as administrator and teacher certification.  These tenets of French law 
exist to promote equality in education regardless of religious affiliation.168  In 2003, the 
Lycée Averroes High School, the first approved Muslim school, opened in Lille, with a 
local Muslim teacher serving as the headmistress.  Ms. Sylvie Taleb now covers her head 
at school, although she had not previously covered during her seventeen years of 
experience teaching at a local Catholic school.169  This mosque-housed school—and the 
habit of such a response—grew out of the mosque’s 1994 efforts to educate Muslim girls 
who had been expelled for wearing headscarves in public schools that had implemented 
their own bans before the law went nationwide.  The school applied for and received 
permissions to open in 2003.  Non-Muslim students are welcome to apply, and the 
language of instruction is French.  
To date only three Muslim schools have opened in France, while the central 
government has processed an additional four requests for  the creation of Muslim schools.  
The records do not suggest the existence of a significant number of illegal, private 
schools along the lines of the forerunner to the Lille school of the 1990s.170  In other 
words, the evidence shows that most Muslim students are remaining in French public 
schools, despite the headscarf ban.  They are neither segretated nor self-segregating.  
Moreover, the longer these students remain in the French schools, the likelier they are to 
integrate into French society.  They will bring their elders closer to the French 
mainstream, and their children will be even more fluent in French and, hopefully, 
inculcated with French values.   
If youth are the key to generational integration and the school system is the 
secular means to this end, then the rise of les filles cabas is one indication of how some 
young Muslims are attempting to integrate despite resistance from their local Muslim 
communities.  Les filles cabas, or “shopping bag girls,” are young Muslim French women 
who always carry a small bag or makeup kit with them.  As they depart their Muslim 
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neighborhood they wear their traditional garb with a head covering, but underneath they 
have on western-style clothing.  Thus, they can remove their “armor” when they depart 
their Muslim neighborhood in the public-housing projects and enter “proper” France.171  
In this way, they maintain a presence in both worlds. 
To be sure, this double-existence is not integration, although it may be a step on 
the way.  The true test of integration for many of these young Muslims will come after 
their school years, when they no longer will have the “safety net” of a French law to 
protect them if they choose to remove their scarves.  Ultimately, they will have to 
negotiate for themselves some kind of resolution—though the question remains whether 
they will find any compromises in tradition-minded  families.  At the same time, those 
who choose to wear the hijab face the same conundrum vis-à-vis non-Muslim France:  
will conventional, traditional French co-workers support a woman’s decision to cover her 
hair according to her beliefs?  Will they view the headscarf as a symbol of the woman 
opposed by a backwards-looking fanatical tradition?  Or will they ostracize their peer for 
being too plainly un-French?  Will young Muslim women be forced to choose between 
proudly displaying their religious beliefs or a professional life in the French 
workforce?172 
C. RACISM COUNTERS INTEGRATION 
As we have seen, the “received” French history of Muslim immigration depicts 
Muslims moving from North Africa to serve as les tiralilleurs, or conscripts to the French 
Army during the two world wars, as well as Muslim immigrants into continental France 
to serve as laborers in post-war reconstruction.  Much debate has centered on the 
“sudden” appearance of “second-generation immigrants” in the 1980s, even though race 
has been a prominent factor in the French psyche for centuries.173  
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The “sudden” appearance of these immigrants in contemporary France is a 
product of the “structured exclusion”174 of Muslim immigrants in (and by) French society 
in the previous three to five decades.  As French society introduced immigrant 
populations, these immigrants were relegated to suburbs throughout the major 
metropolitan areas of the country.175  Such names as Clichy-Sous-Bois and Argenteuil 
are today synonymous with the impoverished housing projects that are scattered across 
the banlieues, those working-class suburbs of major cities, including Paris, that are 
primarily constituted of working- and lower-class immigrant families.176   
Additionally, the preponderance of these banlieues is not actively patrolled by the 
police.  In fact, the police are almost entirely reactive, turning up in these areas only to 
apply heavy-handed tactics to quell violence.177  During an interview with French law 
enforcement, this author was shocked to learn that the French police do not believe in 
community policing, a program of engaged, proactive local law enforcement that has 
found much favor in unruly urban areas in the United States.  The French police rejected 
any suggestion of hiring officers of certain ethnicities or religions to work in areas that 
were represented by that ethnicity or religion as racist, a first step toward 
communautarisme.  Our candid conversation revealed that racial profiling, deemed racist 
and illegal in the United States, is an accepted practice among the police force in 
France.178  Openly separate (and unequal) law enforcement makes just one example of 
the “structured exclusion” that keeps untold French Muslims from feeling entirely at 
home in the Hexagon. 
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This “structured exclusion” is a “metaphor for hypocrisy” in communities where 
youth are taught Republican values and égalité in their “exclusive” multi-story slums of 
the “outercity,” while the children of the Français de souche remain in their idyllic 
French urban or rural lives.179  Français de souche, or those French citizens with a 
native-French lineage, often refer to themselves as the Françaises justes, or true French.  
As noted above, French legislation, steeped in universal Republican values, prevents any 
reference to race or ethnicity in bureaucratic matters, census, etc.  However, colorblind 
French society is supposed to be, race is of signal concern in contemporary life for the 
people in and around these racialized communities.180 In Paris in 1997, Peabody and 
Stovall regularly saw street graffiti with racist phrases such as “Islam equals AIDS,” 
underscoring the existence among some of a view of Muslims as a “large group of 
undesirables.”181   
This situation was thrust to the forefront of the “true” Frenchmen’s consciousness 
when, in the summer of 2005, French and international media aired the story of the 
“Affaire des incendies.”  These accounts not only reported the deadly apartment fires that 
killed numerous low-income sub-Saharan immigrant squatters as they perished inside 
condemned residential structures, but they also thrust into the public spotlight the 
profound social inequalities that immigrants, particularly Muslims, face in France 
today.182  
In France, the unemployment rate among Muslims is generally double that of 
non-Muslims.  In addition, comparatively low educational achievement and, 
subsequently, meager skill levels, perhaps a product of sequestration and reluctance to 
allow women to achieve educational goals, creates a uniquely low level of workforce 
participation by Muslim women in particular.  In France, the “face of crime” is 
increasingly young, and Muslim.  Media coverage of “Islamic terrorists” and police 
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shows that mirror the U.S. television series, “Cops,” only further stoke the flames of fear 
and segregation.183 As a New York Times article in April of this year articulated, racism 
in employment is endemic in the country, with persons having names of Arabic or 
African origin 50 percent less likely to receive a job than someone named François or 
Nathalie.184  That same New York Times article described the conditions in the suburbs of 
Paris as well as the racism and brutality of police as providing the tinder for an inevitable 
explosion. 
In late March 2007, at the Gare du Nord—a major transfer point in the public 
transportation station in France that connects rail to metro, as well as a primary stop on 
the line to the Charles de Gaulle International Airport—a young, Muslim Frenchman 
without a ticket was stopped by the ATP, the local transportation police.  Approximately 
three hours and fifteen minutes later, 100 youths responded to this “affront to their 
immigrant brother” by rioting and burning ticket machines and key infrastructure.  The 
authorities responded in force to quell the violence, which resulted in the arrest of nine 
immigrant youths.185  To some observers, two Frances exist: the first is “democratic and 
dynamic”; the second, “old, conservative, and xenophobic.”186  But can either France 
really accommodate the French Muslims? 
D. ISLAM AND ISLAMAPHOBIA IN FRENCH POLITICS 
As Trica Keaton highlights, the choice for those who love France is “not to fall 
back on reactivism, or to retreat from reason, or even to lock ourselves into some form of 
fixed identity politics.  It means that a strategy has to be found to include your ‘other’ 
children in the nation, without reducing them to an outdated identity of Frenchness, or 
ethnic absolutism.”187  Ideas like Dr. Keaton’s have spawned such groups as SOS 
Racisme and Collectif égalité, organizations that exist to counter racism and xenophobia.  
                                                 
183 Keaton, 68. 
184 Interview with U.S. Embassy, Paris, staff member, April 4, 2007. 
185 Interview with U.S. Embassy, Paris, staff member, April 4, 2007. 
186 Keaton, xi. 
187 Ibid. 
 61
These fears underlie the current political shift to the right in France, however, and surely 
figured in the May 2007 presidential election victory of Nicholas Sarkozy.   
The extreme right party in France, the National Front, led by former French 
paratrooper and Algeria veteran Jean-Marie Le Pen, has recently experienced 
unprecedented growth in membership and support.  This rightward shift in mainstream 
politics has been dubbed by some the “Le Pen Effect.”188  Political rhetoric has increased 
in volume and stridency in regard to restrictions on immigration and an increased 
emphasis on national interests both domestically and in EU policy debates.189  Even 
though they affirm the efficacy of integration in public, many Frenchmen believe that 
European and Islamic values are not only incompatible but directly challenge one 
another.  These Europeans see Muslims as challenge to their collective identity, 
traditional values, and public policies.  Such cultural and religious distinctions as the 
wearing of the hijab and other Muslim accoutrements; the requirement for halal foods; 
seemingly ubiquitous mosque construction; Islam in schools; and demands for Muslim 
burial rites all serve to divide the French community.  Further, the perceived lack of 
women’s rights in Muslim families, church-state relations, and Islam’s compatibility with 
democracy dominate political discourse.190  It is an uneasy national conversation. 
As political leaders and candidates attempt to resolve and reconcile these issues, 
Muslim leaders might serve as a part of the political process to promote understanding.  
Politically, the French Muslim community is involved in national life, however 
underrepresented they are in all institutions of the nation and society.  Despite the French 
government’s attempts to develop and foster Muslim groups to represent the community, 
23 percent of French Muslim citizens are not registered to vote, compared to 7 percent of 
the French population at large.  A recent International Crisis Group study found that the 
political under representation and social disengagement of French Muslims should raise 
concerns in France, lest the void be filled with random violence or religious 
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radicalism.191  In 2004, the French Parliament received its first, openly Muslim 
members—two of 908 members—since the independence of Algeria and the departure of 
the Algerian representatives.  This minimal representation, coupled with the fact that only 
2.4 percent of all local elected officials are of North African origin, shows that, despite 
the large numbers of Muslims in France,192 they have yet to organize politically and 
make their voice—or voices—heard as members of  the French polity.  
It is important to remember that the French Muslim population does not speak 
with a single voice, particularly on matters of integration.  Jytte Klausen, a European 
scholar who focuses on Muslim immigrants and societies within Europe, examined the 
public opinion on secularism in France.  She highlighted three types of Muslims within 
French society: the Voluntarist, the Secular Integrationist, and the Neo-Orthodox.  She 
found that the Voluntarists—those who believe that Muslims should not join or attempt 
to join the French mainstream and that this separation is compatible with French 
society—accounted for 30 percent of those surveyed.  Some 60 percent of French 
Muslims fell into the category of Secular Integrationists, who believe French Muslims 
should join the French mainstream and are compatible with French society and values. 
Only 10 percent of those surveyed voiced the Neo-Orthodox belief that French Muslims 
should stay out of the mainstream and are not compatible with French society.193   
If Klausen’s findings are accurate—and 90 percent of French Muslims generally 
support the French program of secularism or integration—then one must ask why the 
debate about integrating Muslims even exists within France. Ideed, a recent Pew survey 
found that large percentages of both the general public (74 percent) and the Muslim 
minority population (72 percent) feel there is no conflict between living in modern 
France and serving Allah as a devout Muslim.194 Stéphanie Giry, in her October 2006 
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Foreign Affairs article, wrote: “The French must drop the assumption that the only ‘good’ 
Muslims eat saucisson [sausage/pork] with their red wine.”195   
Many scholars believe that either a rise in Islamaphobia has caused a Muslim 
backlash, or the Muslim failure to integrate has caused Islamaphobia. Zachary Shore of 
the University of California, Berkeley, and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, wrote that “Pan-Islamism is rising in part because young Muslims feel 
excluded from European society as well as from their parents’ country of birth.”196 This 
type of social isolation and Muslim self-encapsulation promotes a further inward turn of 
French Muslims.  Polls demonstrate that in 2001, Muslim identification was stronger than 
in 1994, with the percentage of “believing and practicing” Muslims increased by 25 
percent.197  Reports of increased fundamentalism only serve to further French fears of 
these “others.”198   
The Pew Foundation’s findings do not support the idea of an overabundance of 
radical Islamists within France.  Sixty-four percent of French Muslims stated that 
violence against civilian targets to defend Islam was “unjustified.”199  At the same time, 
France also has one of the highest rates of inter-marriage between Muslims and 
traditional Europeans in Europe (in 1990, 20 percent to 30 percent of Algerian women 
below the age of 35 had married a Frenchman of non-Islamic background),200 which 
attests to a daily kind of integration and mutual acceptance of the most normal and 
normalizing sort.  Despite this normalizing force, a Sorbonne professor who heads the 
Observatoire des Discriminations, a French think tank that focuses on workplace 
discrimination, found that a job applicant with a name of North African origin was six 
times less likely to get an interview than an applicant whose name sounded Franco-
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French.  In fact, the study further found that out of six factors being studied, only one— 
physical or mental disability— was more detrimental than being of African heritage.201 
On March 23, 2007, the French Parliament adopted the final version of a law 
against marital violence within France.  The law also included raising the legal marriage 
age to 18 years old (from 15) for girls, the same minimum age as for boys in the country, 
and a provision that makes the rape of a spouse or common-law spouse illegal. On the 
surface, the law appears benevolent and supportive of women in France.  However, the 
law also places marriage to foreigners under stricter controls.  Statistically in France, 
from 1999 to 2003, the number of French citizens marrying foreigners increased 62 
percent, and out of 45,000 marriages, one in three were considered mixed marriages.202  
Legislation such as the 2003 headscarf ban, and the March 2007 law tightening marriages 
to foreigners give Muslims the perception that they are being further discriminated 
against. 
E. THE THREAT: A SENSE OF ALIENATION 
As the cleavages within the society grow, the fear of Islamaphobia increases 
among Frenchmen, while Europhobia increases among immigrants.  A recent Le Parisien 
article asked citizens questions on social unrest due to ethnic turmoil.  The article 
reported that 86 percent of those queried feared unrest would break out again, and 82 
percent indicated that they had little hope that government efforts to fight high 
unemployment and racial violence would prove effective.203 
In June 2005, as Minister of the Interior, Nicholas Sarkozy visited the “sensitive 
zone” of La Courneuve outside of Paris.  While there, he pledged to clean the racaïlle, or 
scum, off the streets of France with a Kärcher, the well-known industrial hose used for 
street cleaning and graffiti removal.  Such comments may create more schisms.  As 
William Safran, a political scientist, wrote in 1986, “Low economic status, the alien 
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culture, and the persistence of racism stimulate Muslim immigrants to turn to their 
countries of origins and maintain their culture while fully expecting to remain where they 
are.”204  This is seen by many Frenchmen as a type of double allegiance,205 although the 
phenomenon may speak more to the bifurcated lives of many French Muslims, who live 
their own version of the “shopping bag girls’” endless costume party.  
On the one hand, a recent Pew Survey on global attitudes demonstrated that 91 
percent of Muslims in France have a positive view of Christians, while the opposite is 
true of Muslims in Muslim countries.  The same survey found that 93 percent of Muslims 
in France have little to no confidence in Osama bin Laden; 64 percent believe suicide 
bombings are never justified, while 16 percent said they are sometimes justified, and 19 
percent stated that suicide bombings are rarely justified.206  Against this statistical 
backdrop, one is hardly surprised to learn that 89 percent of French Muslims see Islamic 
extremism as threat to their society and way of life.207 
On the other hand, there remains the 9 percent of Muslims who hold unfavorable 
opinions of Christians, the 7 percent who believe in bin Laden, and the 36 percent who 
think that suicide bombings are justified in certain situations (and will say as much to a 
pollster).  They constitute a small, yet potentially extremely lethal segment part of the 
social landscape in France.  As the European Union’s Centre for Monitoring Xenophobia 
and Racism stated in a recent report, extremists result from a lack of a sense of belonging, 
and contemporary European Muslims’ sense of belonging could be eroded, risking 
alienation.  That alienation is the real danger to Western societies, as it may lead to acts 
of terror.208 
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V. THE CONCLUSION OR JUST THE BEGINNING? 
In France, a day spent in the concrete corridors of Mantes-la-Jolie 
illustrates the combustible mix of unemployment and despair, prejudice 
and lack of identity that makes Europe’s Muslim Ghettos a likely target 
for Islamic extremists wishing to recruit for their cause.209 
 
Terrorism has become the topic du jour in circles of media and scholarship.  In 
recent years, the word “Muslim” has become synonymous with terror in the daily lexica 
of France and other Western societies.  However, this thesis demonstrates that terrorism 
is not a spontaneous or stand-alone problem. Terror and other forms of extremism in 
France—whether imminent or imagined—mark an end form of the true issue:  social 
exclusion, or alienation, or isolation of French Muslims. French society’s republican 
values of liberty, equality, and fraternity make no distinction for such identity factors as 
ethnicity and religion.  For the (as yet) majority French, the universalism of the 
Revolution’s programmatic slogan coexists in the French national self-image with 
peculiarly French ways of affecting these liberal-democratic ideals.  The circle is harder 
to square for France’s Muslims.  On the one hand, La Grande Nation aspires to embody 
the universal values rooted in the Revolution and the Enlightenment, particularly where 
relations between citizen and state are concerned.  On the other hand, this French identity 
clashes with Muslim cultures and conventions at levels that are fundamental to both.  
Stuck in between is France’s Muslim minority—along with France’s cherished 
aspirations for integration and, indeed, Frenchness. 
To be sure, the French ideals have plenty of life left in them.  The November 2005 
riots throughout France were characterized as a Muslim uprising in much Western media 
looking to document the pending “culture war” of academic rumor. A closer examination 
of the rioters’ signs and chants shows that they never called for such extremist institutions 
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as jihad, sharia, or a caliphate.  Instead, posters demanded only employment, justice, 
equality, and civil rights—an entirely French call to action.210  
To this end, some Frenchmen, including President Sarkozy, believe affirmative 
action policies have merit as a means of lessening socio-economic gaps and the attendant 
pressures on the French polity.  However, many in France cling to their Republican 
values and reject these programs as racist. Increasingly, even die-hard French 
Republicanism is finding something to like in discrimination positive, as long as such a 
program is based solely on economic considerations, without taking race or religion into 
account.  
At the same time, Muslim scholar Bassam Tibi, argues that the Europeanization 
of Islam—or, on the individual level, the proper integration of Muslims into European 
society—is both desirable and possible.  Tibi writes that leaders within the religious 
community must inform their members that they can and should participate in the secular 
duties of good citizens and neighbors.  He goes on to compare the history of both Jews 
and Protestants, once discrete minorities who eventually embraced their host societies, or 
at least agreed to participate in the politics—and the modernity—of the majority culture 
without necessarily abandoning the requirements of their respective faiths.211  Muslim 
leaders in contemporary Europe might look toward the Haskalah, or Jewish 
Enlightenment in Europe of the 1770s through the 1880s, in which the European Jewry 
sought to integrate themselves into their European host society in dress, language, and 
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loyalty.  Ideas such as Moses Mendelssohn’s “be a man outside and a Jew at home” 
demonstrate that one does not have to forgo religious beliefs for societal acceptance.212  
A. TERROR—PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 
This study has highlighted statistical data and recent legislation that focus on 
perceptions.  In particular, rising Islamaphobia213 in Western cultures fosters a perception 
of Muslims as Islamic extremists, while Europhobia among Muslims is fueled by 
perceptions of racism and alienation.  The upshot is mutual misunderstanding at least—
and extremism and terror at worst.  These risks are clearly associated with social 
cleavage. 
In his prescient article in 1986, William Safran explained that Muslims in France 
develop a greater identification with Islam for three major reasons.  First, he states that 
Muslims identify with Islam more as it implies a membership in a large and influential 
community.  Second, when they are not accepted in French society, French Muslims step 
up their observation (or orthodoxy) because they believe Islam gives them a sense of 
purpose.  Lastly, Islam provides a form of psychological security to believers, 214 as is 
evident in the aforementioned underground Muslim school of Lille or even the daily 
situation of “shopping bag girls” who seek that psychological security, or a preservation 
of a cultural identity as they change their identity with the removal or addition of a hijab. 
                                                 
212 For more information on the maskilim, or followers of the Haskalah, see Shira Schoenberg’s 
article “The Haskalah” in The Jewish Virtual Library.  Available at 
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rates in immigrant communities are less a factor of religion than of affluence, and these rates have 
decreased in accordance with an increased social status.  Conversion to Islam is a relatively small number 
in comparison to the aforementioned categories; however, it is the adherence to the Muslim faith, or the 
extreme adherence to it that raises concern. 
214 William Safran, “Islamization in Western Europe: Political Consequences and Historical 
Parallels.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 485, From Workers to 
Settlers? Transnational Migration and the Emergence of New Minorities (May, 1986), 104. 
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If Safran is correct, then an alienated Muslim, immigrant or citizen, in France becomes 
“more” Muslim as a result of his perception of alienation within his host society. 
When this author visited the Grand Mosque of Paris in April 2007, one of the 
foremost questions asked of the Muslim interlocutors was what they thought of the 
secularization or Europeanization of Islam.  Each of the seven Muslims with whom this 
interviewer spoke that afternoon stated that they were French and believed that their 
religion was not in conflict with their country or its government.  These men touted the 
ideas of the Republic. To a man, however, they all insisted that their government has 
failed them, especially in anti-discrimination measures.  Each affirmed that he had no 
anger for France, but they all sense that Islam is under attack.  They believe their white 
neighbors harbor fear and distrust of Muslims.  They further described what they see as 
ubiquitous social and religious discrimination.  Young and old Muslims alike repeatedly 
accentuated their poor employment opportunities, bad schools, and unfair representation 
in government.215  When asked what led Muslims to support terror, whether ideologically 
or literally, these men all stated that they believed that their Muslim brothers were easy 
“prey” for radicals, as these Islamists are able to use religious association to convince 
despondent, disenchanted, and unemployed Muslims both in Europe as well as in French 
society.216 
The discussion of the creation of a terrorist, or the support to terrorists, begs the 
question of how many exist in a given society.  According to Timothy Savage in his 
article on Europe and Islam in 2004, Europe’s Counterterrorism officials estimate that 1 
percent to 2 percent of the continent’s Muslims—or a total of 250,000 to 500,000 
people—are involved in some type of extremist activity.217  The distinction between 
extremism and terrorism is important here; these officials also stated that they are unclear 
                                                 
215 Interview with by author Parisian Muslims at Grande Mosque de Paris, April 5, 2007. 
216 Ibid. 
217 This statistic does not articulate a level or type of participation.  A reader may see 1-2 percent as a 
small portion; however, this author has included the raw figure of 250-500,000 in order to illuminate that 
this relatively “small” number might be incredibly dangerous and lethal if using modern technology to 
incite terror. 
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as to how many Muslims on the continent would support terror.218  Savage goes on to 
describe the men of the September 11 attacks on the United States as “examples of 
immigrants whose ideas were radically transformed in Europe.  According to French 
experts, only a minority of European Islamist terrorists had been passionate fanatics in 
their Muslim home countries prior to coming to Europe. … Few return home to fight. … 
They take up jihad in other places.”219   
French scholar of Islam Olivier Roy stated that the Muslims who become 
terrorists follow the pattern of European extremists from the 1970s and 1980s.  Roy 
believes that modern-day Muslim terrorists, like the members of Germany’s Rote Armee 
Faktion, Italy’s Brigatta Rosso, and France’s Action Directe, are comprised of cells of 
disaffected, European-educated (with university or technical degrees) males who share a 
common, marginal culture.220   
French Counterterrorism Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière stated that radicalization is 
an enormous risk.  But the greater hazard comes with the departure of radicals to receive 
training and experience fighting abroad before their return to France, where they would 
become both highly lethal and extremely influential among other disaffected Muslims.  
Bruguière stated that France’s “chief concern is to stop the flow of European Muslims 
into and out of Iraq, where they get hands-on training in weapons and terrorist tactics.”221 
The preponderance of Muslim terror today is committed by groups of Muslims 
gathered in social networks.  As the former Foreign Service Officer and Middle East 
scholar Marc Sageman showed, using social network analysis of centralized and 
decentralized terror organizations, terrorist acts very often stem from a group of friends 
who collude to commit terror after developing a collective sense of isolation and/or social 
exclusion.  He specifically highlights first and second generation Northern African Arabs  
 
                                                 
218 Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 2004), 31. 
219 Savage, 34. 
220 The French social scientist, Olivier Roy, is one of the leading voices in modern discourse on Islam 
and Europe.  His The Failure of Political Islam is renowned as are his countless articles on the subject. 
221 Interview by National War College students of Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, May 12, 2006. 
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in France, who formed networks and “sought friendships [acceptance] in local 
mosques.”222  According to Sageman, global jihad “gave them both a cause and 
comrades.”223   
Officials in the French anti-terrorism directorate echoed Sageman’s findings.  
These officials said that Muslim Frenchmen join radical groups for three major reasons: 
humiliation by proxy, due to events in the Middle East; personal humiliation in the West, 
from discrimination, etc.; a lack of assimilation in the West, leaving them without a 
group identity except for that provided by radical groups.224  This view was shared by a 
spokesperson for the French General Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN) who also 
provided three catalysts: the failures of political Islam to achieve goals for Muslims; 
personal humiliation at the hands of security services, a result of racism or 
discrimination; or humiliation by proxy from events in the Middle East, particularly in 
Palestine.225 
B. BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
The terrorist issue forms a vicious circle.  A largely unreflective fear of extremist 
violence confirms to Frenchmen that Muslims in France pose a physical threat to the state 
and the nation, and the French look to the law, as well as myriad social practices, to 
enforce order—and, distantly, Frenchness.  In turn, this response reinforces for Muslims 
the prevalence of French racism, which further isolates the French Muslims and sows 
more disenchantment.  From these circumstances, fears of terrorism may be answered 
with terrorist acts.  Although the 2003 headscarf ban, so far, seems to have had relatively 
little direct impact on the functioning of schools, some 1200 to 2000 Muslim girls desire 
to continue to wear their hijabs.  This minority is important, because just as hate crimes 
                                                 
222 Sageman continues that, these Muslims “became particularly lonely and emotionally alienated in 
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223 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.  (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of 
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and murders have been sensationalized by the Western media, the plight of these girls is 
and can continue to be sensationalized by the Pan-Islamists. 226   
France, and indeed the European Union must take steps now to promote future 
research.  They must learn from the successes and failures of immigration reforms in 
other Western countries, as well as reviewing standards and techniques for integration of 
immigrant populations.  The development of policies and restrictions that facilitate 
further integration are key to social collusion and peace.  More broadly, the immature 
governing body of the new, united Europe must address such policies as the place of 
religion in public life, social tolerance in Europe, and secularism as the only path to 
modernity and European identity.  The Europeans, in general, and the French, in 
particular, must come to terms with their pride and patriotism—and identify what is truly 
racism.  Understanding and adapting the collective habitus is vital to the European past 
and present. 227   
In the French case, as Eugen Weber wrote, “Revolution had brought with it the 
concept of national unity as an integral and integrating ideal at all levels, and the ideal of 
oneness stirred concern about its shortcomings.  Diversity became imperfection, injustice, 
failure, something to be noted and something to be remedied.”228  Rethinking what it 
means to be French must not, and can no longer be avoided.  As a nation, France has 
been and continues to be transformed through its membership in the E.U., as well as 
through immigration, globalization, domestic politics, and various other cultural, social,  
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227 Habitus, a term coined by Pierre Bourdieu in the field of International Relations Theory, is the 
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and political phenomena that transcend borders.229  The French government must again 
inculcate its citizens with the values of liberal democracy—updated, if necessary, to 
accommodate a more diverse citizenry. 
1. Politics 
The contemporary political landscape in France consists of various Muslim 
organizations that purport to represent Muslims.  However, many Muslims believe these 
bodies are largely invalid due to the various ethnic and religious differences amongst 
Muslims in France.230  Oftentimes local or regional issues overcome key national issues 
as these different groups identify with the country of origin of their members.231  The 
most prominent national organization is the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman 
(CFCM), which encompasses most of the mufti in Paris and Marseille.  The CFCM is a 
creation of the French government, however; as such, it is well received by non-Muslims, 
but not yet accepted by the Muslim community.232   
Another central, national-level organization is the Union des Organisations 
Islamiques de France (UOIF), which, as a subgroup of the Federation of Islamic 
Organizations in Europe, has many links with Arab governments.  Often this organization 
negotiates with the French government in accordance with the position of those 
governments rather than the Muslims it claims to represent.233   Throughout the country, 
other Muslim organizations exist, but these groups are not aligned per se with the French 
government for the discussion or negotiation of issues.  The two most prominent are the 
Participation de Culte Musulman (PCM), which focuses on spiritual aspects of Islam and 
political mobilization on such key issues as racism and sexism; and the Conseil 
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Musulman de France (CMF), which allegedly is closely linked to the Swiss scholar, 
Tariq Ramadan, who openly advocates the reinterpretation of the Koran and the idea of a 
“Euro-Islam.”234 
Many of the Muslims in France believe their politicians pander to the sense of a 
“greater” Muslim world on issues within the Hexagon that affect their daily life.  As these 
politicians cater to the “Muslim factor, ” or finding commonality in political opinion, in 
international politics rather than focusing on their growing constituency of Muslims, they 
continue to avoid addressing domestic strife.235  Additionally, Timothy Savage points out 
that European politicians perpetuate this type of “stability strategy” by failing to 
undertake any policy change that might affect the seeming stability in Muslim 
neighborhoods.  (By seeming stability, that is to say, that the avoidance of addressing 
domestic issues and relegating Muslims to their banlieues, perpetuates their exclusion 
from the polity.  This relative stability, which includes the ever-increasing domestic 
violence, only remains so long as disenchanted Muslims remain relatively non-violent 
and find solace in their politicians’ attempts to find commonality on international issues.)  
These politicians and governments have “sought to prop up regimes in order to” placate 
Muslim Europeans and also to “slow immigration flow and/or quarantine Islamic 
fundamental contagion.”236 
This notional stability might prove very short-lived if change is not forthcoming.  
Political change must occur within the French and European systems that includes and 
properly represents Muslims, of all types, within the polity.  The “one size fits all” 
approach that many French and European politicians have utilized has failed to represent  
                                                 
234 Interview with by author Political Advisor, U.S. Embassy, Paris, April 4, 2007.  This information 
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235 This fact is both due to the influx of electronic and modern media from throughout the Muslim 
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or even understand properly the “variety and diversity of Muslim communities, sectarian 
differences, non-hierarchical nature of Islam, and other structural and functional 
differences from Christian religions.”237 
That is not to say that the onus lies solely on the continental Europeans.  Muslims 
within France and greater Europe must voice their concerns as citizens, not extremists.  
First, they must, as Bassam Tibi writes, render their religion compatible, as did the 
aforementioned Jewry of the Haskalah more than a century ago, with the society with 
which they have entered.   
Also, as voters within the French democracy, the growing Muslim constituency 
can influence both international and domestic policy.  For example, a group of 
approximately twenty representatives from the infamous Clichy-Sous-Bois district 
outside Paris (infamous for the November 2005 riots) met with presidential candidate, 
Sègoléne Royale, in February of 2007, to highlight their views from this zone sensible.  
These representatives emphasized their desire to pass a “citizens social charter” to French 
elites, stating that the “message of the riots of 2005 hasn’t been heard.”238  Their social 
charter was uniquely Republican in that it demanded no special consideration for 
Muslims or immigrants as such; they called only for liberty, equality, and fraternity.  
Collective Muslim voices politically organized as this was, may continue to receive 
audience with French politicians, such as President Sarkozy. 
2. Racism 
The experience of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States may provide 
insight to future, French and even European Union initiatives to reduce racism in the 
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polity.239  Just as U.S. courts affected change when legislatures lagged behind social 
change, French and European courts can also codify laws to similar ends.  First, these 
courts must continue to create laws and demand the enforcement of equal opportunity 
legislation, as is their judicial responsibility.  These courts must maintain the view of the 
greater law of universal values, as was evident in the U.S. decisions, the key aspect of 
citizenship for all members of the society is the true acquisition of rights, and the 
enforcement of these rights.  The second key requirement is for the state to enforce these 
rights and that citizens have a vehicle for the addressing of their grievances.  Black 
Americans used those rights to achieve true legal equality in the American Civil Rights 
Movement.  All Europeans, of all races, must become a true part of the polity, thus 
receiving rights, services, etc. 
The year 2007 was designated “European Year of Equal Opportunities for All.”  
Two European Community Directives—the Racial Equality Directive and the 
Employment Framework Directive—define a set of principles that offer everyone in the 
E.U. a common minimum level of protection against discrimination.240  However, the 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia stated in a recent report that 
“Muslims like other religious group remain inadequately recorded statistically, and more 
research is essential to record attitudes and the extent of victimization; Muslims are often 
the victims of negative stereotyping; Muslims, particularly young people, face limited 
opportunities for social advancement which could give rise to hopelessness and 
alienation; and data shows most Muslims are disproportionately represented in areas with 
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poor housing conditions and their educational achievement falls below average.”241  
Europeans must make significant changes in this “year of equality” to promote that the 
parity proclaimed by their own founding documentation and fondest political habits of 
thought.  Such measures might also make the world safer. 
C. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
As a terrorism expert noted in a recent Economist article, “Terrorism is not on the 
run, it is on the march.”242  The collusion of the GSPC, which had proclaimed France as 
its primary enemy, with al-Qaeda may be an attempt to develop a fifth-column inside 
Europe among the North African Muslim population in Europe.  Osama bin Laden’s 
deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, recently proclaimed that the new al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, or the area in the northwest of Africa, would “be a thorn in the necks of the 
American and French crusaders and their allies.”243 
Despite the Islamaphobic ideas that spur the extreme right parties in France and 
elsewhere in Europe, one of the crucial arenas of immigrant integration will continue to 
be the basic community.  Representation of all peoples at all levels of democracy 
facilitates trust and understanding, which eventually leads to mutual acceptance.  As 
Rachid Hamoudi, the director of the Lille Mosque stated, “We must tell youths that 
France doesn’t want to hold them down… .  We must ensure that the community trusts its 
country, and vice-versa.  If you get to know me, you will get to trust me.  If I get to know 
you, I will trust you.”244  Bassam Tibi argues that Muslims must adapt themselves to a 
“new European context marked by different values.”245  At the same time, traditional 
Europeans must move beyond fears of cultural differences and learn to trust their not-so-
new neighbors.  Tibi wrote that Europeans, also, must focus on their secularism, but also 
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their liberal rights.  As the author Timothy Garton Ash wrote, “if we—for want of a 
better word—traditional Europeans, manage to reverse the current trend, and enable 
people … to feel at home as European Muslims, they could be a source of cultural 
enrichment and economic dynamism, helping to compensate for the downward drag of 
Europe’s rapidly aging population.  If we fail, we shall face many more explosions.” This 
author concurs with Mr. Ash.  Any failure to promote integration will lead to more 
explosions, whether they be political, interpersonal, social, or, worst of all, literal.  The 
well-known French maxim “A la revolution il faut du sang,”246 proclaims that blood is 
necessary for a revolution.  Ensuring that a literalist program based on this slogan does 
not develop among Muslim immigrants is the key to the future of French, and potentially 
Western peace and security.    
As the Pew Global Attitudes survey highlighted, “The problem lies neither with 
your average Muslim or your average Westerner, but with extremists.”247  To curtail the 
“creation” of extremists or their relative ease in recruiting literal, material, or ideological 
support is to undo an environment of social exclusion.  Despite the rising Islamaphobia in 
European minds and the sense of exclusion among French Muslims and immigrants, the 
most common ideas are those expressed by Nour-eddine Skiker, a youth worker near 
Paris.  The young Frenchman of Moroccan descent proclaimed, “I feel completely 
French.  I will do everything for this country, which is mine.”248  The true problem lies 
not in how youth like Mr. Skiker feel, but more so how his French countrymen feel about 
these “other” or “darker” Frenchmen.  Nadir Dendoune stated, “How am I supposed to 
feel French when people always describe me as a Frenchman of Algerian origin?  I was 
born here.  I am French.  How many generations does it take to stop mentioning my 
origin?”249 
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As Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall highlight in their work, The Color of Liberty, 
this author also means “to emphasize how the Islamic and/or African presence in 
France—while of course having altered the demographic and cultural identities—should 
by no means be understood as a threat to ‘Frenchness’ but rather should, alongside other 
immigrant experiences, emerge as constitutive Hexagonal and European identity. … 
[French and European elites and Islamaphobes must] let go of reductive and misinformed 
monolithic and unilinear historical narratives.”250  As Bruce Hoffman writes, “In the final 
analysis, it must be recognized that there is no single, universal solution to the problem of 
terrorism—be it either the domestic or international variant.  Yet, this fact only reinforces 
the need for multiple creative solutions, if not to resolve, then at least to control the 
growth of terrorism and contain is violent manifestations.”251  Europeans promoting and 
embracing diversity while reducing alienation and exclusion, and the perceptions of 
isolating factors, coupled with Muslim integration and secularization, may be the most 
productive and effective methods to counter terror and those who espouse it.  It is 
certainly the essence of Frenchness. 
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